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Current estimates predict that 30-40 percent of the population will be infected 
with the flu virus during a pandemic. Fire departments should anticipate a higher attack 
rate for their personnel because of increased exposure risk. Additionally, many variables 
will negatively influence fire fighter participation rates over and above these attack rates. 
This thesis analyzes fire fighters’ ability and willingness to participate in a 
pandemic through a comprehensive survey of fire fighters within the twelve National 
Capital Region fire departments. Issues that may influence fire fighters’ ability and 
willingness to work include childcare, concern of family, adequate personal protective 
equipment, worker’s compensation coverage, and availability of vaccines and antivirals.  
Collectively, these variables determine a workforce participation percentage (WPP) — 
the share of fire fighters who will be able and willing to participate in a response during a 
pandemic. Results indicate that between 30-70 percent of the fire fighters will not be able 
or willing to work during a pandemic. Although a fire fighter’s participation is 
situationally dependent, fire departments should take urgent steps to address five core 
areas.  These are included in a set of recommendations.  Ultimately, the priority 
recommendation is for fire officials and regional public policymakers to rise to the 
challenge of the complexity of these issues.  Leadership in the face of this recognized 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The fire departments within the National Capital Region (NCR)1 have for a 
number of years worked collaboratively on many response and preparedness initiatives. 
The effective overall response to the September 11, 2001, attack on the Pentagon is 
indicative of this work. The 9/11 Commission Report noted that the three reasons for the 
successful response were “first, the strong professional relationships and trust established 
among emergency responders; second, the adoption of the Incident Command System;2 
and third, the pursuit of a regional approach to response.”3  
The post-September 11 environment has further enhanced this partnership 
between the NCR fire departments as their collective focus has centered on preparedness 
initiatives for potentially catastrophic events deemed a serious threat against the NCR. 
One of the most pressing issues within the NCR is pandemic/infectious disease 
preparedness. Although many NCR fire departments have initiated various preparedness 
and response efforts, a comprehensive regional response plan has not resulted from this 
cooperation even though a pandemic will likely affect all jurisdictions within the NCR 
equally and simultaneously.    
A core question underlies any approach to a regional pandemic plan, or even 
separate jurisdictional plans:  do we know fire fighters’ ability and willingness to 
participate in a response to a pandemic event?  Research on professional responders in 
                                                 
1 The National Capital Region (NCR) is defined by the Metropolitan Washington Council of 
Governments (COG) as the area containing the following jurisdictions: the City of Alexandria, Arlington 
County, the District of Columbia, Fairfax County, Loudoun County, Montgomery County, Prince George’s 
County, Prince William County, and all inclusive municipalities. 
2 “In March 2001, the Washington area Council of Governments adopted the NIIMS ICS model. Thus, 
there is a common understanding of basic working relationships among local jurisdictions. However, 
establishing and maintaining command of the response to the Pentagon attack was daunting. There were 
thousands of people and hundreds of equipment apparatus from more than a dozen different jurisdictions, 
as well as many Federal, State, and Arlington County government agencies, and scores of volunteer 
organizations, businesses, and individuals. This understandably challenged the leadership of a fire 
department that usually directs the efforts of some 260 uniformed personnel. Although the ACFD 
performed well in responding to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon, the actual experience of coordinating 
the multifaceted response proved significantly more challenging than previously envisioned.” Titan 
Systems Corporation, Arlington County: After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 
Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon (Arlington, VA: The County, 2002), A-21. 
3 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York, NY: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2004), 314. 
2 
other emergency services shows that only a fraction will respond, or are able to respond, 
to the new biological threats.  For planning purposes, an assessment of fire fighters’ 
response would begin with determining a workforce participation percentage (WPP): the 
share of fire fighters who will be able and willing to participate in a response during a 
pandemic.  From the outset, this participation rate will be seriously affected by the spread 
of the disease itself.  For instance, the Department of Heath and Human Services’ 
Pandemic Influenza Plan calculates plans for a clinical attack rate (the rate at which the 
disease will affect the population) of 30 percent.4  For fire fighters,5 with an anticipated 
increased exposure, fire departments should anticipate a higher attack rate for their 
personnel. Additionally, there are many variables, specific to fire department personnel, 
which will negatively influence participation rates. Consequently, the WPP for fire 
fighters will be greater than the estimated 30 percent clinical attack rate. Fire department 
personnel are of course the critical node for all fire department operations. Whether or 
not departments can provide sufficient emergency and non-emergency services to their 
community is, therefore, primarily contingent upon adequate staffing levels. 
This thesis has several objectives.  First, it provides a baseline workforce 
percentage for fire fighter participation in a pandemic in the NCR.  Although a variety of 
issues will collectively determine baseline workforce levels in an actual event, a 
reasonable estimate can be drawn from the available scientific data on past pandemics 
and data collected from a survey conducted specifically for this thesis. Determining a 
fact-based workforce participation percentage will assist fire departments in developing 
reasonable and practical pandemic plans.  
Second, the thesis will examine the various influences on fire fighters’ ability and 
willingness to respond to an emergency.  With this assessment, fire departments will be 
challenged to design and implement corrective interventions that address these major 
influences.  The goal of this analysis is to motivate fire departments to take measures to 
increase participation levels before a pandemic occurs.                                                    
4 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, November 2005), 18, 
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdf/HHSPandemicInfluenzaPlan.pdf (accessed January 12, 2008). 
5 Fire fighters within the NCR are trained to a minimum level of Emergency Medical Technician and 
are responsible for responding to medical emergencies on a daily basis.  This is discussed at greater length 
in Chapter 4. 
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Third, the estimate of the rate of participation and the analysis of behavioral 
influences are used to identify and develop recommendations for fire department actions.  
These recommendations range from internal department initiatives to broader legislative 
changes.  In each case, the underlying theme is for emergency planners and, specifically, 
fire departments to greatly improve their workforce planning as part of a broader strategy 
of preparing for a pandemic event. 
The data for this thesis is drawn from a survey of NCR fire departments; their 
respective employees were surveyed, studied, and analyzed collectively to establish a 
significant data set which identifies fire fighters’ concerns and issues with participating in 
a pandemic. It was also deemed necessary to do a comprehensive analysis on the region 
simply because a pandemic will likely affect the entire NCR equally and simultaneously. 
Regional preparedness, planning, and response will require coordination among the NCR 
fire departments. Analyzing fire fighters’ ability and willingness to participate in a 
pandemic on a regional level is a critical first step of this process as these issues will be 
central to preparedness and planning efforts. 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION 
The National Capital Region was created pursuant to the National Capital 
Planning Act of 1952 (Title 40, U.S.C., Sec. 71) and defined the jurisdictions within the 
NCR.6  Since 1952, the NCR has expanded to the District of Columbia and eleven 
jurisdictions in the State of Maryland and the Commonwealth of Virginia.7 The NCR is 
the forth largest metropolitan region area within the United States, consisting of over 
6,000 square miles and over 4.2 million people.8 
The Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (COG) is a regional 
organization of local governments within the NCR. “COG is composed of 21 local 
governments surrounding our nation’s capital, plus members of the Maryland and 
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "National Capital Region - Office of the National Capital 





Virginia legislatures, the U.S. Senate, and the U.S. House of Representatives.”9 The NCR 
was the site for this research and the COG was the group used to facilitate the process. 
All of the surveyed jurisdictions are located within the NCR and are members of the 
COG. The following jurisdictions were participants in the survey: District of Columbia, 
Montgomery County and Prince George’s County in Maryland, and the City of 
Alexandria, Arlington County, Fairfax County, Fairfax City, Loudoun County, and 
Prince William County in Virginia. 
B. PRE-SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, NCR FIRE DEPARTMENT 
COLLABORATION 
Prior to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the Pentagon, much of the 
collaboration between the NCR fire departments was facilitated through personal 
relationships between fire department leaders and participation in the Metropolitan 
Washington COG.  This collaboration was a primary reason for the successful response at 
the Pentagon. The COG provides a suitable venue to address fire department pandemic 
preparedness, planning, and response. Not all jurisdictions, agencies and businesses 
within the NCR, though, participate in the COG. 
COG provides a focus for action and develops sound regional responses to 
such issues as the environment, affordable housing, economic 
development, health and family concerns, human services, population 
growth, public safety, and transportation.  Founded in 1957, COG is an 
independent, nonprofit association. It is supported by financial 
contributions from its participating local governments, federal and state 
grants and contracts, and donations from foundations and the private 
sector. Policies are set by the full membership acting through the board of 
directors, which meets monthly to discuss area issues.10 
The COG is one of the primary venues for various fire-related groups from the 
NCR to meet and discuss jurisdictional, regional, and national issues. Perhaps the most 
influential collaboration occurred in 1995-96 with the development of the Metropolitan 
Medical Response Team (MMST). Following the sarin nerve agent attack in Tokyo, 
Japan in 1995, many progressive emergency response leaders recognized that the United 
States lacked the capacity and capability to respond to a similar type of event. The 
                                                 
9 Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments, "Metropolitan Washington Council of 
Governments: Serving the National Capital Region: About COG," http://www.mwcog.org/about/ (accessed 
October 5, 2007). 
10 Ibid. 
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chairman of the COG Fire Chiefs’ Committee, Arlington County Fire Chief Edward 
Plaugher, requested that the COG Chairman, Jack Evans, send a letter to President 
Clinton requesting assistance for preparedness and response to weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) incidents. As a result of this letter, the United States Public Health 
Service (USPHS) requested COG assistance in developing the nation’s first locally-based 
WMD response team. The team was developed through the multi-jurisdictional COG fire 
subcommittees. The MMST was comprised of fire fighters, hazardous material 
technicians and specialists, and paramedics from the NCR fire departments.   The group 
also included law enforcement personnel from the NCR police departments and doctors 
and nurses from various local hospitals.  According to the Arlington County: After-Action 
Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon, “this 
pioneering work produced the framework for the Metropolitan Medical Response System 
(MMRS), [which is] now embraced by more than 100 U.S. metropolitan areas. It was the 
predecessor to the National Medical Response Team (NMRT), which played an 
important response role at the Pentagon.”11  
The development of the MMST was truly a collaborative effort among the NCR 
emergency response organizations that established the foundation and enhanced the 
relationships for greater inter-jurisdictional cooperation and support. The COG is a 
mechanism that has facilitated and enhanced this collaboration between local 
governmental agencies and departments and has played an important role in facilitating 
fire department collaboration within the NCR. The challenge facing fire chiefs and the 
COG is continuing this effort in collaboration for enhanced regional preparedness. 
Since September 11, 2001, the NCR fire departments have increased their 
capabilities to respond to WMD incidents through two primary methods. First, individual 
departments have enhanced their capabilities, training, and education for response to a 
WMD incident through individual initiatives. For example, Arlington County Fire 
Department purchased radiation dosimeters that were placed on every fire department 
                                                 
11 Titan Systems Corporation, Arlington County: After-Action Report on the Response to the 
September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon (Arlington, VA: The County, 2002), 6, 
http://www.arlingtonva.us/departments/Fire/edu/about/FireEduAboutAfterReport.aspx (accessed January 
30, 2008). 
6 
vehicle to assist in early recognition of the presence or absence of radiation. Although 
other fire departments addressed this particular issue, it was initiated independently.  
Secondly, fire departments have also enhanced preparedness for WMD events 
through the collective acquisition of supplies and equipment purchased through available 
federal monies, such as Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI) and Metropolitan 
Medical Response Systems (MMRS) grants. The focus has been on improving the 
preparedness and response capabilities for WMD incidents through identifying critical 
regional fire department deficiencies that would be necessary or essential for a significant 
emergency requiring regional assistance. Since 2003, the COG fire departments have 
received over $66 million through UASI funded projects.12 Through MMRS the region 
has received has received $2.9 million and is poised to receive an additional $900,000 in 
2008.13  This funding has not only enhanced preparedness within the NCR, but has 
helped to foster collaboration between the twelve fire departments. Fire departments 
worked together to identify and prioritize deficiencies, develop grant proposals and 
applications, and accept and implement the equipment or initiatives awarded through the 
grant(s).   
Table 1, COG Fire UASI Funded Projects, show the projects and dollar amount 
awarded to the NCR fire departments through the UASI grants. 
                                                 
12 Council of Governments, Council of Governments Fire UASI Funded Projects. Powerpoint 
Presentation, September 7, 2007. 
13 Personal Interview with James Schwartz, January 22, 2008. 
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Table 1. COG Fire UASI Funded Projects 
(As of September 7, 2007) 
 
Mass Casualty Support Units/Ambulance Buses $2,630,000 
NCR Bomb Squads and Regional Caches $7,289,595 
Mass Decontamination Program $2,000,000 
Metro Subway Security Initiative $4,650,000 
Mobile Air Unit $11,839,104 
NCR Incident Management Team $786,674 
NCR Radio Cache/Communications Training $6,274,613 
Personal Protective Equipment $20,977,822 
WMATA Communications Upgrade $8,898,885 
WMD Operations Training $1,265,190 
Total $66,611,883 
 
Within the NCR, the focus of preparedness has, understandably, centered on 
WMD incidents. The attack on the Pentagon and the subsequent anthrax attacks 
occurring one month later had an indelible effect on the entire region. As a result, the 
priorities, outside of preventing another attack, focused on improving the capabilities and 
capacity to effectively respond to weapons of mass destruction. 
However, from a fire department perspective, a core question is whether or not 
these priorities, and the focus on weapons of mass destruction, are our greatest threat?  
Now that the regional capabilities have improved, should the focus shift to preparing for 
other threats?  The imminence of a pandemic and its potential catastrophic consequences 
suggest that such an event should be placed at the top of the list.   
C. PANDEMIC 
A pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus manifests itself and is spread 
easily from human to human through coughing and sneezing.  Federal authorities 
describe this process a bit more formally: “A pandemic occurs when a novel influenza 
virus emerges that can infect and be efficiently transmitted among individuals because of 
8 
a lack of pre-existing immunity in the population. The extent and severity of a pandemic 
depends on the specific characteristics of the virus.”14  While influenza pandemics are 
rare, occurring three times in the previous century (1918, 1957, 1968), they have the 
potential to cause more death and illness than any other public health threat. According to 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “a pandemic that reaches the scale of the 1918 
influenza outbreak would sicken approximately 90 million people, and kill 2 million 
more in the U.S. alone.”15 Almost 10 million people could be hospitalized during the 
course of the pandemic, which may take more than a year to evolve.16 
According to the World Health Organization (WHO) an influenza pandemic is a 
reoccurring event.17 Although a pandemic is certain to occur, when and how it emerges is 
unknown. Currently, the scientific and public health community has a particular concern 
with the virus H5N1. Commonly referred to as “avian” or “bird flu,” H5N1 is a strain of 
influenza that has primarily infected wild and domestic birds in Asia and parts of Europe. 
As the birds migrate, the virus spreads to other countries. According to the WHO, as of 
February 13, 2008 there have been 360 confirmed cases with 226 deaths.18 In the 
majority of the reported cases, the cause of the infection has been due to close contact 
with the infected birds. The Department of Health and Human Services observes that:  
Of additional concern are the few instances where secondary transmission 
from person to person may have occurred. Given these events, we are 
currently in a Pandemic Alert Phase 3, defined by WHO as ‘human 
infections with a new subtype but no human-to-human spread or at most 
rare instances of spread to a close contact.’19  
                                                 
14 DHHS, HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, 4. 
15 U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Emergency 
Preparedness, Science and Technology, Protecting the Homeland: Fighting Pandemic Flu from the Front 
Lines, February 8, 2006, 2, http://www.upmc-
biosecurity.org/website/resources/hearings/content/Hearings_2006/20060208protecthmlnd.pdf (accessed 
November 13, 2006). 
16 DHHS, HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, 4. 
17 World Health Organization, "Ten Things You Need to Know about Pandemic Influenza," 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/pandemic10things/en/ (accessed February 13, 2008). 
18 World Health Organization, "Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza 
A(H5N1) Reported to WHO," 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2005_11_07/en/ (accessed February 
13, 2008). 
19 DHHS, HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, 5.  
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D. WHY FIRE DEPARTMENTS SHOULD BE PREPARED 
Traditionally, the fire service responds to emergencies that can be seen and felt – 
structure fires, automobile accidents, and medical emergencies. In the mid-1980s, 
however, the fire service began to expand its mission to justify its existence in the face of 
a decline in the incidents of structure fires. Fire departments were ideally positioned 
throughout communities and so became the logical agencies to take on increased 
responsibilities. The fire service became responsible for responding to, and providing a 
variety of emergency services for, incidents involving medical emergencies, hazardous 
materials mitigation, technical rescue, and WMD response. Government leaders and the 
general public now expect fire departments to effectively and efficiently respond and 
mitigate any emergency. This has placed a tremendous burden on the fire service to 
position itself to respond to and mitigate “all hazards” and to adequately train and prepare 
fire fighters for such eventualities. In the past, “out of the ordinary” emergency incidents, 
such as a chlorine leak or window washer rescue, were handled by specialized response 
teams that were trained to handle such emergencies. The trouble and challenge for 
“unknown” events, specifically radiological and infectious disease incidents, is that they 
will likely require all fire fighters to respond in some manner or form. Fire departments 
are forced to prioritize preparedness and training objectives and consequently these low 
probability/high consequence events are placed on the backburner; fire fighters are not 
given the knowledge or training necessary to prepare them practically or psychologically. 
The expanded mission of the fire service has not been matched with equitable support, 
funding, or personnel. Fire departments throughout the United States struggle to maintain 
a balance between the fundamental, traditional mission and that of the new, expanded 
mission in the post-September 11th world. 
Since September 11, these expectations have continued to grow as the threat of 
an influenza pandemic has intensified.  Fire departments are expected to participate in a 
pandemic response and will likely play a significant role as the demand for emergency 
services increases exponentially. For these reasons, fire departments must again balance 
priorities.  
This expectation, in addition to the increased demand for medical services and the 
potential catastrophic consequences of the pandemic, suggests that fire departments need 
10 
to be better prepared. Fire departments themselves will be faced with personnel and 
equipment shortages which will hinder and impede service to the community. In 
preparing, fire departments can address many of these issues prior to a pandemic, likely 
resulting in a larger workforce being available and subsequently providing more services 
to the community.  
One area of improved preparedness is likely to be an ability to anticipate and 
manage a higher rate of infection among fire fighters than the general population.  The 
fire service should anticipate that fire fighters, who are trained and responsible for 
providing medical care, will have a greater exposure risk (over and above the attack rate) 
than the general population during a pandemic.  
The attack rate is defined as “the cumulative incidence of infection in a group 
observed over a period during an epidemic.”20  Experts generally agree that the clinical 
attack rates will be between 25 and 30 percent.21 This alone will drastically impact fire 
department workforce levels, as a quarter of the workforce will likely be infected during 
a pandemic. Simultaneously, the attack rate will significantly increase the demand for 
emergency medical services, as a quarter of the population becomes infected. 
This increase in demand will result in an increased exposure risk to fire fighters 
who are called to assist, treat, and transport flu victims. Increased exposure and contact 
with flu victims will raise the likelihood of personal infection and subsequently increase 
the risk of exposure to fire fighters’ families. Fire fighters who become infected will not 
be able to participate in further fire department response operations and the potential 
infection of family members will reduce the willingness of fire fighters to participate in 
further response operations.  
                                                 
20 John M. Last and J. H. Abramson, A Dictionary of Epidemiology, 3rd ed., eds. J. H. Abramson and 
others (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 9. 
21 Congressional Budget Office, A Potential Influenza Pandemic: Possible Macroeconomic Effects 
and Policy Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, 2006), 8, (accessed January 30, 2008).  
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Fire fighters’ participation rates will also vary due to other personal and family 
conditions.  These influences fall in to two categories: willingness and ability.22 
Willingness refers to individual decisions on whether or not to show up for work. Ability 
relates to a variety of independent factors which may affect a fire fighter’s capacity to 
work and reflects the likelihood of an individual actually participating (rather than 
willingness to work if capable). Some fire fighters may be willing to participate in a 
pandemic, but are not able; others may be able to respond, but are not willing. 
E. APPLICABILITY TO FIRE DEPARTMENTS NATIONWIDE 
The data gained from this study has applicability to fire department throughout 
the United States. Perhaps the greatest utility will be in pandemic planning as this data 
will provide a solid, reliable estimate for fire fighter participation which can be utilized 
by departments in the development of their plans. Additionally, the variations in fire 
department structure within the National Capital Region, mirrors variations found in fire 
departments throughout the U.S. Although no “all-volunteer” fire departments were 
surveyed, combination departments and “all-paid” departments were. 
Although the majority of fire departments within the U.S. are strictly volunteer, 
and many fire departments within the NCR utilize volunteers to supplement their 
workforce, the focus of this study centered on professional fire fighters. It is 
recommended that further studies be conducted on volunteer fire fighters’ ability and 
willingness to participate in a pandemic.  It is possible to infer that, generally, the issues 
for all-volunteer departments would be consistent with those found in this study.  
F. SUMMARY 
Our communities and government leaders expect that fire department services 
will be available during a pandemic. The range of fire department services will be 
dependant upon the number of fire fighters available to work. At a minimum, fire 
departments must anticipate a workforce reduction of 30 percent due to the clinical attack 
rate; however, additional concerns may  impact the ability and willingness of fire fighters 
to participate in a pandemic. These concerns, if not sufficiently addressed prior to the 
                                                 
22 Gershon K. Qureshi, Health Care Workers’ Ability and Willingness to Report to Duty during 
Catastrophic Disasters (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005); Shelly Schechter, Medical 
Reserve Corps Volunteers' Ability and Willingness to Report to Work for the Department of Health during 
Catastrophic Disasters (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007), 
http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-image.exe/07Mar%5FSchechter.pdf (accessed January 30, 2008). 
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next pandemic, will significantly reduce the workforce participation percentage (WPP). 
Fire departments can positively influence the WPP by addressing these concerns through 
independent departmental programs and through collaborative initiatives developed and 
maintained through the COG. The certainty and potential consequences of a pandemic 
warrant that greater attention be paid to these issues by fire departments throughout the 
NCR.   
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before pandemic response plans can be developed, fire departments must 
determine what percentage of the workforce will be able and willing to participate in a 
pandemic, epidemic or other infectious disease event. In addition to the clinical attack 
rate of the virus, many factors and variables affect fire fighters’ ability and willingness to 
participate in a pandemic. Collectively, these variables are used to determine a workforce 
participation percentage (WPP). A WPP is the estimated percentage of fire fighters that 
will be able and willing to participate in a pandemic response with their respective 
department. Determining the WPP will allow fire departments to establish realistic and 
practical pandemic response plans because these rates will be based on available fire 
department personnel. The identification of the issues that may impede participation will 
assist departments in implementing measures to increase future participation.   
International and national health organizations estimate that 25 to 40 percent of 
the population will be infected with the virus during the course of a pandemic. As part of 
its planning assumptions, for instance, the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan states “The 
clinical disease attack rate will be 30% in the overall population.”23 This number is often 
used as a planning assumption for various agencies, businesses, or professions, and for 
the majority of these institutions this assumption is appropriate. However, for those 
agencies, businesses, and professions that are expected to play a significant role during a 
pandemic, i.e. police and fire departments, hospitals, and public health workers, many 
variables, over and above the clinical disease attack rate, come into play, affecting the 
overall WPP. For example, profession-specific studies have shown that nearly half of 
local health department workers are likely not to report to duty during a pandemic.24 
Concerns, independent of the clinical attack rate, affect participation. These concerns 
vary for different professions; the worries or challenges health care workers have 
regarding participation in a pandemic will be different than the worries and challenges of 
police officers. Thus, it is necessary to conduct specific studies for specific professions.  
                                                 
23 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan D-12. 
24 Ran D. Balicer, et al., "Local Public Health Workers’ Perceptions Toward Responding to an 
Influenza Pandemic," BMC Public Health 6 (2006), 99-106, http://www.hopkins-
cepar.org/downloads/publications/Local_Pub_Health.pdf (accessed January 30, 2008), 1. 
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The primary focus of this chapter is on the applicability and comparison of the 
existing literature on participation rates in other professions to fire fighting.  The 
objective is to identify the conditions that influence other professions’ response to 
emergencies and to evaluate the strength and value of these conditions in understanding 
the firefighters’ potential behavior in the National Capitol Region. 
A. WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION STUDIES 
Few, if any, studies have been conducted on fire department workforce 
participation levels during a pandemic. As a result, the best guidance in exploring 
emergency participation comes from studies of other professional groups, including 
health care workers and the public health community in general.  Analyzing these studies 
is important because these occupations have similar responsibilities and will play a 
significant role in a pandemic. According to the American Public Health Association 
(APHA) “projections estimate that up to forty percent of the active workforce may be 
seriously ill and therefore unable to work during some portion of a flu pandemic. 
Therefore, if staffing levels remain stagnant, the current health care workforce cannot be 
depended on in the event of a flu pandemic.”25 Identifying accurate and reliable 
workforce levels for a pandemic is critical to the development of effective and practical 
plans for all emergency responders.  
The report, Health Care Workers’ Ability and Willingness to Report to Duty 
During Catastrophic Disasters, examines both the ability and willingness of health care 
workers (HCW) to report to work during various catastrophic events.26  The study 
assessed the ability and willingness of HCW in the New York City region to report to 
work during different types of catastrophic events.27 Over 6,400 HCW from forty-seven 
health care facilities in and around New York City participated in the study. The majority 
of the respondents were full-time employees, working on day-shift, most were female, 
and nearly half were forty-five years of age or older.28 
                                                 
25 American Public Health Association, APHA’s Prescription for Pandemic Flu (Washington, DC: 
American Public Health Association,2007), 3, http://www.apha.org/NR/rdonlyres/D5017DB9-F400-4399-
A656-939C4C8DF259/0/FLUpolicycomplete.pdf (accessed March 18, 2007).  




At the time this survey was conducted, no study had previously examined both the 
willingness and ability of HCW to report to work during catastrophic events.29 The report 
suggests that there is a distinct difference between the two concepts.  The authors define 
ability as “the capability of the individual to report to work.”  Willingness, they write, 
“refers to a personal decision to report to work.”30 Results indicate that HCW were most 
able to report to work for a mass casualty incident (MCI) (83%) and environmental 
disasters (81%) and were most willing to report to work during a snow storm (80%) or 
MCI (86%). Factors which influenced willingness were fear, concern for family and self, 
and personal health problems. Factors influencing ability included transportation 
problems, child care, eldercare, and pet care obligations.31     
A group of Israeli researchers have also examined the willingness of state-wide 
hospital personnel to report to work following an unconventional missile attack.   In their 
study, entitled Willingness of Staff to Report to Their Hospital Duties Following an 
Unconventional Missile Attack: A State-Wide Survey, these researchers examined the 
willingness of hospital personnel to report to work in a hypothetical scenario in which a 
chemical warfare missile attack has occurred and the hospital staff has been asked to 
report to their respective hospitals before an “all clear” has been given. Overall, 42 
percent of the responding staff was willing to report under the presented scenario; 
however, the willingness increased appreciably when safety measures were provided.32  
The purpose of the survey was to assist in determining a national policy for adequate 
staffing levels for hospitals on alert.  
A survey of 308 health care workers was conducted at three Maryland health 
departments to assess factors influencing their ability and willingness to report to duty in 
a pandemic.33 The results suggest that almost half of the public health workers will not 
report to work in a pandemic. “…the data suggest[s] that regardless of the expected  
 
                                                 
29 Qureshi, Health Care Workers’ Ability. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 378. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Balicer, et al., Local Public Health Workers’ Perceptions, 1. 
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morbidity among personnel during an influenza pandemic, nearly half of the local health 
department workers are likely not to report to duty during such an extreme public health 
crisis.”34  
1. Specific Issues and Concerns Impacting Workforce Participation 
Existing surveys also identify a range of potential influences on emergency 
responders’ behavior that may be useful in anticipating firefighters’ actions.  Gershon 
Qureshi’s study of public health nurses, for example, found that 90 percent of the nurses 
reported at least one perceived barrier to reporting to work during an emergency.35 
“Child/elder care obligations were noted as the most important barrier (32%), followed 
by lack of transportation (14%), and personal health issues (14%).”36 
Researchers have also identified appropriate training and the availability of PPE 
as critical influences on medical and public health workers’ willingness to work in 
catastrophic events. Qureshi’s study of HCW demonstrated that increasing safety 
measures resulted in a significant increase in willingness to report to work.  
The Qureshi study also found “the most frequently cited reasons for employees’ 
unwillingness to report to duty during a disaster was fear and concern for the safety of 
their families and themselves.”37 This fear could be exacerbated for fire department 
personnel because of the potential for extended work periods and the increased and 
intense patient contact involved in a pandemic response. Furthermore, the study showed 
that the willingness of health care workers to report to work during a catastrophic event 
were lowest for events “in which the employees are more likely to perceive the highest 
degree of risk to themselves or their family (smallpox, chemical, radiation, and 
SARS).”38  
Other studies support these concerns for family and personal health.  Nancy 
Demme’s study of police officers’ roles during a biological event establishes that the 
                                                 
34 Balicer, et al., Local Public Health Workers’ Perceptions, 5. 
35 Gershon K. Qureshi, et al., "Emergency Preparedness Training for Public Health Nurses: A Pilot 
Study," Journal of Urban Health 79, no. 3 (September 2002), 415. 
36 Ibid., 415 
37 Qureshi, Health Care Workers’ Ability, 386. 
38 Ibid., 385. 
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number one priority of officers is the safety of their families.39 Additional concerns of 
officers included their sense of duty, availability of vaccine, and personal protective 
equipment.  Shelly Schechter surveyed the ability and willingness of Medical Reserve 
Corp volunteers to participate in public health emergencies. Her survey identified six 
possible barriers to ability to respond to a public health emergency: child care, lack of 
training, elder care, personal health problems, pet care obligations, and other job 
commitments.40 Four barriers to willingness were identified as: concern for personal 
health and safety, lack of personal protective equipment, concern for health of family 
members, and lack of information regarding risk.41 
Various personal issues will undoubtedly reduce the available health care 
workforce as medical professionals remain home to care for sick family members or 
refuse to come to work altogether for fear of becoming infected and thus potentially 
infecting family members. “During a catastrophic event, employers must recognize that 
their health care workers are likely to be as (or even more) concerned than the average 
citizen, because they might have a greater understanding of the associated risks.”42 
2. Fire Fighter Participation  
There are many similarities in the expressed concerns and issues of the 
professions mentioned previously and fire fighters within the NCR. As a fire fighter and a 
manager of a regional weapons of mass destruction (WMD) response team (comprised 
primarily of fire fighters within the NCR), I am uniquely positioned to interact and 
discuss these issues in a regional context. To my knowledge, there have been no studies 
conducted specifically on fire fighters ability and willingness to participate in a 
pandemic. Therefore these discussions and interactions become a reasonable source for 
determining fire fighters’ concerns and priorities, not only in responding to WMD 
incidents but in pandemics as well. Additionally, many of the concerns that exist for fire 
fighters responding to a WMD incident parallel their concerns when responding in a 
                                                 
39 Nancy Demme, Government Expectations and the Role of Law Enforcement in a Biological 
Incident (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007), http://bosun.nps.edu/uhtbin/hyperion-
image.exe/07Mar%5FDemme.pdf (accessed January 30, 2008), 33. 
40 Schechter, Medical Reserve Corps Volunteers', 29. 
41 Ibid., 30. 
42 Qureshi, Health Care Workers’ Ability, 386. 
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pandemic. Concern for families and children and appropriate personal protective 
equipment are consistent with previous studies and from discussions with other fire 
fighters.  
Unique issues, absent in previous studies and specific to fire fighters, are also 
identified through these discussions. For example, in developing the COG Radiological 
Dispersal Device Response Guideline,43 there was much discussion on the short- and 
long-term health consequences of exposure to radiological materials and the subsequence 
protection afforded through worker’s compensation. Due to the similarities between the 
two events, one can infer that because these issues were a concern in a radiological 
emergency, they would be a concern in during a pandemic.  
Issues such as the availability of vaccines and antivirals and the lack of fire 
department plans have also been identified through these discussions and planning 
meetings. Collectively, all of these factors become critical variables to a fire fighter’s 
ability and willingness to participate in a pandemic because there is no certainty that 
these protections will be in place or available before the next pandemic strikes.  
3. Solutions to Increase the Fire Fighter Workforce Participation 
Percentage 
Previous studies of the ability and willingness of emergency responders to 
participate in various events attempted to identify new policies and practices that could 
improve the likelihood of a response.  The Israeli study, for example, identified four 
intervention measures that would increase the participation by 75 percent.44   The sum of 
these recommendations is a call for a multilayer approach requiring action by individual 
fire fighters, fire departments, and the local, state, and federal government. A complex set 
of legal, moral, and ethical issues interact with personal and departmental priorities to 
determine participation rates. The challenge for fire departments and government in 
                                                 
43 This standard operating guideline, for which I was the primary author, seeks to establish a model 
procedure that provides safe and efficient response for first-arriving emergency service personnel during a 
radiological dispersal event. This model provides a framework for building a regional protocol tailored to 
the National Capitol Region (NCR). It was developed so that a first responder will have knowledge of the 
broader process in which they may be requested or required to assist. It outlines response parameters and 
gives consistent dose limits for fire department personnel in a response to a radiological incident within the 
NCR. 
44 Yaron Shapira, et al., "Willingness of Staff to Report to their Hospital Duties Following an 
Unconventional Missile Attack: A State Wide Survey," Israel Medical Science Journal 27 (1991), 710. 
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general is to find ways to influence this complex set of issues if they hope to maximize 
the rate at which their emergency responders will be both able and willing to show up and 
be effective during a pandemic. 
This complexity is evident in several recommendations to governments and 
agencies.  For example, the American Public Health Association (APHA), in their report 
APHA Prescription for Pandemic Flu, makes recommendations on improving and 
strengthening federal plans and strategies to ensure that all individuals, families, and 
communities are as prepared as possible for a flu pandemic.  The Association 
recommends that legal protections focus on licensure reciprocity, protections from legal 
liability, workers’ compensation coverage, and employee protection.45 Additionally, 
APHA recommends reforming the national Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
(VICP). This program:  
Has created a no-fault system that pays for injuries caused by specific 
immunizations…Congress added influenza to VICP in 2004. However, the 
VICP only covers trivalent (annual) influenza vaccine. Health care 
workers and patients would be less likely to volunteer without a fair 
compensation system, as the failed smallpox vaccination campaign 
demonstrated.46 
The federal government’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) also provides direction on health protection to employers for protecting their 
employees against avian viruses and provides technical information on the viruses. The 
document gives guidance for a variety of workers who may be exposed to the virus, 
ranging from poultry employees to healthcare workers.47 
The World Health Organization (WHO) created a model similar in 
concept to the American volunteer fire department, whereby they can “call 
up” the required experts needed to respond to an outbreak or situation that 
outstrips the response capacity or capability of the WHO. These experts 
are located in universities and hospitals throughout the world and 
                                                 
45 American Public Health Association, APHA’s Prescription for Pandemic Flu (Washington, D.C.; 
American Public Health Association, 2007), 3. 
46 Ibid., 10. 
47 U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, OSHA Guidance 
Update on Protecting Employees from Avian Flu (Avian Influenza) Viruses (Washington, DC: Department 
of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2006), 
http://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_AvianFlu/avian_flu_guidance_english.pdf (accessed February 10, 
2008). 
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volunteer their services when requested by the WHO. This year (2005), 
thousands of deaths were prevented following the tsunami thanks to this 
coordinated effort. Last year, meningitis outbreaks which swept across 
northern Africa were controlled with massive vaccination campaigns. And 
right now teams from North and South America, from Europe, and from 
Africa are fighting to keep Marburg outbreak contained in Angola.48   
One of the few fire departments to focus on pandemic planning and anticipated 
workforce reductions is the Seattle Fire Department.  Its draft pandemic/infectious 
disease plan addresses workforce protection issues and how the department will adapt 
services based on the available resources and personnel.49 Pandemic plans will have 
added value, in the Seattle FD’s view, if they can be adopted to all hazards which cause a 
simultaneous increase in demand and stress on the department’s capabilities. Having an 
“all hazards” response plan may increase the incentive for fire departments to develop 
pandemic plans, as these plans can then be utilized or adapted for a variety of responses.  
B. SUMMARY 
The value of these earlier studies and reports lies primarily in their identification 
of general conditions that influence emergency response behavior.  Some of these general 
circumstances will likely apply to firefighters.  For example, family safety and personal 
health issues may apply across professional groups.  Other conditions, however, may be 
specific to fire fighters.  The purpose of the next chapter is to begin to explore these 
shared and unique influences on fire fighters through a recent survey of the fire 
departments throughout the National Capitol Region. 
                                                 
48 House Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, Twenty-First Century Biological 
Threats, 109th Cong., 1st sess., 2005, Committee Print, 29, https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/legis/nps17-
042806-01.pdf&code=914032755131b4e00df3a587fd35357a (accessed March 3, 2007).  
49 The Seattle Fire Department Pandemic/Infectious Disease Plan (Seattle, WA: Seattle Fire 
Department, April 20, 2007). 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The overall objective of the research conducted for this thesis was to collect 
experiences and opinions on participating in a response to a pandemic event from fire 
fighters throughout the NCR.  Through documentation of these views, this thesis should 
contribute to fire departments’ preparedness planning. 
A. RESEARCH DESIGN  
Research with NCR’s fire fighters requires support from leaders throughout the 
area.  On June 14, 2007, I met with Arlington County Chief James Schwartz, head of the 
COG Fire Chiefs Committee, to obtain his commitment to the research project and his 
assistance in working with the twelve NCR fire department chiefs. Chief Schwartz agreed 
to send a letter to the NCR fire chiefs, briefly explaining the project and requesting their 
departmental participation.  All the fire chiefs agreed to support the effort and provide a 
departmental representative to coordinate contact with fire fighters throughout the region. 
This study utilized a web-based survey tool to collect quantitative data on ability 
and willingness to participate in a pandemic response.  Departmental master rosters or 
email lists provide an updated, accurate count of total personnel.  Each department’s 
master list also provides the population counts from which the sampling fractions were 
derived.  A random sample was drawn from each list and a survey was sent by email to 
each selected respondent.  In the case of a few small departments, everyone on their list 
received a survey.  A minimum of three email requests were sent to each jurisdictional 
sample to request their initial response and to follow up subsequently with those who did 
not reply.  The survey period closed on January 19, 2008, nearly four months after the 
initial request.  
1. Description of the Population and Sample 
At the time the survey was initiated there were approximately 7,597 fire 
department employees (FDE) within the twelve NCR fire departments. FDE refers to any 
individual employed by the fire department, including uniform and non-uniform 
personnel. This inclusiveness reflects the reality that, in a pandemic, fire department 
personnel would be equally and simultaneously exposed. The initial sample was a 
proportional random sample, reflecting the broad variation in department size across the 
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NCR.  The largest department in the region is the District of Columbia, which has a total 
of 2,017 firefighters.  The smallest department is Manassas Park Fire Department, with 
only twenty-five firefighters.  Smaller departments have limited resources and greater 
dependence on the willingness and ability of their fire fighters to participate at the time of 
an emergency.  To ensure that these small departments have sufficient numbers in the 
survey to support an analysis of their potentially unique circumstances, the sample was 
stratified proportionally.  In the smallest departments, the survey went to everyone on the 
master list. 
This sampling design met with one particular problem.  The Montgomery County 
Fire Department leaders chose to distribute the survey to the entire department, rather 
than allowing for a random sample of all their personnel.  The department’s cooperation 
was certainly welcomed, but it delayed the process until later November 2007.  Follow-
up requests were also handled by the department.  The president of the International 
Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) Local 1664, the Montgomery County career fire 
fighters union, provided additional assistance by soliciting its members to complete the 
survey.  Through his efforts, the number of survey completions nearly doubled from 172 
to 305.  Unfortunately, however, the response time had to close shortly after his efforts 
began.  As a result, the sample drawn from the Montgomery County fire department was 
not necessarily a random selection.  Although no obvious biases based on who responded 
appears in a comparison of the Montgomery County group and all other fire fighters in 
the NCR, the analysis throughout the thesis will take into account that these 305 
respondents were self-selected rather than drawn from a probability sample. 
The figures in Table 2 below compare the number of persons sampled from each 
of the twelve fire departments with the number of respondents who returned a survey.  
For most of the departments, the intended sample was 15 percent of the total personnel. 
Table 3 shows the final counts of surveyed respondents for each of the twelve fire 
departments compared with the total number sampled from.  When all respondents are 
grouped together for the analysis, each case will be weighted according to its appropriate 
share of the underlying population. 
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Table 2. Population Size and Sample 
 






Alexandria City Fire 
Department 326 49 22 
Arlington County Fire 
Department 325 49 40 
City of Manassas Park Fire 
Department 25 25 16 
District of Columbia Fire and 
EMS Department 2,017 303 111 
Fairfax City Fire Department 76 76 55 
Fairfax County Fire & Rescue 1,619 243 130 
Fort Myer Fire Department 31 31 27 
Loudoun County Fire and 
Rescue 378 57 41 
Metropolitan Washington 
Airport Authority 133 65 43 
Montgomery County Fire & 
Rescue Service 1,339 1,335 305 
Prince George's Fire & EMS 892 134 54 
Prince William County Dept 
Fire & Rescue 436 65 31 
Total 7,597 2,432 875 
 
 
Table 3. Comparison of Montgomery County to All Other Jurisdictions  
 








ALL 11 Other 
Departments 6,258 1,097 570 51.95% 
Montgomery 
County Fire & 
Rescue Service 
1,339 1,335 305 22.84% 




B. RESPONSE ANALYSIS 
Excluding Montgomery County, the overall survey response rate was 52 percent.  
The return rate was much higher in the smaller departments, with 87 percent of the 
members of the Fort Myer Department participating in the survey.  The District of 
Columbia Fire and Rescue Department (DCFEMS), Fairfax County Fire and Rescue 
Department, and the Prince George’s Fire and EMS (PGFD) Department have 2,017, 
1,619, and 892 employees respectively and their individual survey completion rate was 
36.6 percent, 53.5 percent, and 40.3 percent. Fairfax County Fire and Rescue’s survey 
completion rate was higher than that of Alexandria and Prince William; DCFEMS and 
PGFD had the lowest survey completion rate.  
Another possible reason for a higher completion rate (other than size of 
department) has to do with efforts by local leaders to inform their members about the 
survey. Several fire chiefs, or their appointed representatives, requested further 
information about the study to help inform their membership of its purpose and to 
encourage a response.  In several instances, the fire chief or a senior officer distributed a 
department-wide email or attached comments to the initial email. In the case of 
Montgomery County, when the local union president became involved the response rates 
soared.  As anticipated, though, without that help the Montgomery County response rate 
was low.  Only 23 percent of the total membership responded to the survey.   
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Alexandria City Fire 
Department 49 22 44.89% 
Arlington County Fire 
Department 49 40 81.63% 
City of Manassas 
Park Fire Department 25 16 64% 
District of Columbia 
Fire and EMS 
Department 
303 111 36.63% 
Fairfax City Fire 
Department 76 55 72.36% 
Fairfax County Fire & 
Rescue 243 130 53.49% 
Fort Myer Fire 
Department 31 27 87.09% 
Loudoun County Fire 




65 43 66.15% 
Montgomery County 
Fire & Rescue Service 1335 305 22.84% 
Prince George's Fire 
& EMS 134 54 40.29% 
Prince William County 
Dept Fire & Rescue 65 31 47.69% 
 
1. Comparison of Respondents to All Firefighters 
Despite these variable response rates, survey respondents appear generally 
representative of the general population of fire fighters within the NCR.  However, no 
comprehensive fire fighter statistics for the NCR are available; this assumption is based 
primarily on the similar characteristics of the firefighters across the departments that were 
randomly sampled, as well as information generally known in the fire fighter community 




2. Characteristics of Survey Population 
The majority of the respondents were white males averaging nearly twenty-eight 
years of age (27.8).  Sixty-five (64.4) percent of the respondents were married; 75.3 
percent had children. Three out of four fire fighters (74.6%) live outside of the 
jurisdiction in which they work.  Three-quarters (74.5%) worked twenty-four-hour shifts 
and nearly all (99.6%) used their personal vehicle as their primary method of 
transportation to work. 
Although the vast majority of personnel were classified as “Fire and/or Medical 
Operations,” more than one in ten (13.4%) work in “Administrative/Support” positions. 
The most common rank of those classified as “Fire and/or Medical Operations” was “Fire 
fighter/Emergency Medical Technician,” with 36.9% representation. The majority of 
respondents (67.9%) were classified as not holding a command/managerial position. 
C. WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION PERCENTAGE 
One of the primary objectives of this thesis is to determine a baseline workforce 
participation percentage (WPP) for fire fighters in the NCR. This is challenging because 
many factors play into an individual’s ability and willingness to participate, requiring a 
collective analysis of both variables. Willingness refers to individual decisions on 
whether to work. Ability relates to a variety of independent factors which may affect a 
fire fighter’s capacity to work. Ability refers to the likelihood of actually participating, 
rather than whether you would be willing if you could. Fire fighters may be willing to 
participate in a pandemic, but are not able; likewise, they may be able, but are not 
willing. Although 68.8 percent of the fire department employees said they would be 
willing to participate in an avian influenza (bird flu) outbreak, only 30.4 percent said they 
would be able to work if an immediate family member was seriously ill. Willingness and 
ability will be analyzed independently to examine the specific concerns fire fighters have 
with each. Willingness and ability will also be analyzed collectively to determine a WPP.   
1. Baseline Willingness 
The survey asked a wide range of willingness questions on a fire fighter’s ability 
to participate in a pandemic. To determine the baseline for willingness however, a single 
question was used: “In your current fire department position, would you be willing to 
participate in your fire department’s response to an avian influenza (bird flu) outbreak?” 
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Just under 69 percent (68.8%) of the respondents said that they were willing to participate 
in a response to an avian influenza outbreak, with 22.1 percent saying they were “not 
sure.” Although 68.8 percent of the respondents said that they were willing to participate 
in a response to an avian influenza (bird flu) outbreak with their fire department, when 
asked to “rate their level of willingness” great disparity exists. 
The respondents were asked to rate their level of willingness, whereby a “1” 
would indicate not a very strong willingness to participate and a “10” would represent a 
strong willingness, with no concern whatsoever about participating.  Only 11.1 percent of 
the respondents answered “10.” The majority of the respondents (38.6) answered “5,” 
suggesting that although they maybe willing to participate in an avian influenza outbreak, 
their level of concern was significant. The higher the level of concern, the less willing a 
fire fighter will be to participate in a pandemic. Although 68.8 percent of the fire fighters 
surveyed said they would be willing to participate in a pandemic, it is likely this number 
will be lower due to the average level of concern. 
Additional factors influencing fire fighters’ willingness to participate in a 
pandemic are family, self, adequate personal protective equipment (PPE), fire department 
pandemic plans, worker’s compensation coverage, pharmacological interventions 
(antivirals and vaccines), training and education, and various psychological issues.  
2. Baseline Ability 
The most telling indicator of a fire fighter’s ability to participate in a pandemic 
would come from a measurement of their ability to participate when there is an 
immediate family member who is seriously ill.  The “immediate family member” allows 
for the greatest range of respondents, as this would likely have applicability to single and 
married fire fighters alike. The vast majority of fire fighters likely have someone they 
consider an “immediate” family member; conversely, not every fire fighter has 
dependents or living parents. This variable was used to determine the baseline ability 
participation rate. Only 30.4 percent of the respondents said they would be able to work 
for their fire department during a pandemic if a member of their immediate family was 
seriously ill; 27.2 percent said they would not be able and 42.5 percent said they were 
“not sure.” 
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Respondents were asked to rate their level of ability to participate in a pandemic. 
A “1” means there are no factors affecting ability to participate. A “10” means there are a 
significant number of factors affecting ability to participate. Only 9.4 percent of the fire 
fighters said there were “no factors” affecting their ability to participate. The mean score 
was 4.18. This suggests that the majority of fire fighters have a couple of factors which 
will affect their ability to participate in a pandemic. The higher the score, the more likely 
fire fighters will not be able to participate in a pandemic.  
The principal variables affecting fire fighters’ ability to participate in a pandemic 
centers around family. Fire fighters’ ability to participate in a pandemic will be dependant 
upon the well-being of their dependents, parents, and siblings. Additional variables 
include child/dependent care issues, spouses required to work during a pandemic, and the 
care of pets. 
A determination of the baseline willingness and ability participation rates are 
important for comparison reason; however, further analysis and breakdown is necessary 
to achieve a detailed and accurate understanding of the variables associated with each. 
Only then can an accurate WPP be obtained. The following section will analyze in detail 
the variables impacting ability and willingness.  
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IV. ANALYSIS 
Fire fighters are, in general, an altruistic group, often putting themselves in 
compromising, dangerous positions for the sole purpose of helping and saving others. In 
the survey conducted for this study, over 50 percent (50.4%) of the fire fighters in the 
National Capitol Region said the primary reason for joining the fire service was because 
they “wanted to serve the community” or they “wanted to help people.”  Another 34.9 
percent said that “a sense of duty” was the principal reason for continued involvement in 
the fire service.  This collective public commitment was clearly on display during 9/11, 
Hurricane Katrina and, more recently, the spectacular Southern California wildfires.  
Perhaps more importantly, this commitment is acted upon in thousands of daily 
emergencies across the nation. 
This core commitment to serving the public even during moments of great 
personal risk does not, however, override the many strong personal, family, and social 
pressures and obstacles affecting a fire fighter’s ability and willingness to serve during 
emergencies.  As found in earlier literature on other emergency professionals’ propensity 
to serve, fire fighters must overcome a wide range of potential obstacles, some of which 
can be more easily bypassed if fire departments plan early to offer protection and other 
assistance.  
This chapter will examine the obstacles that are certain to impact fire fighter 
participation during a pandemic. Initially we will examine the consequences of the 
clinical attack rate and the increased risk of exposure fire fighters face during a pandemic 
or any infectious disease outbreak. Next is a detailed discussion on the willingness and 
ability of fire fighters to participate in a pandemic and the independent variables affecting 
each individual. Lastly, the interaction of these concepts will be examined to determine 
the Workforce Participation Percentage (WPP) – the share of fire fighters who will be 
able and willing to participate in a response to a pandemic.  
A. CLINICAL DISEASE ATTACK RATE 
Among many of the factors that impact fire fighter participation levels, the most 
fundamental is the clinical disease attack rate for a pandemic. This is the estimated 
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percentage of the population that will become infected with the virus. The rate is 
independent of the severity of the flu virus. For the three previous pandemics, the clinical 
disease attack rate was similar. The DHHS’s Pandemic Response Plan uses a clinical 
disease attack rate of 30 percent for the population in general.50 Pandemicflu.gov states 
the attack rate will likely be 30 percent or higher in the overall population.51 
If fire departments use this attack rate as the core participation number, the 
planning assumption is that nearly a third of their fire fighters will be infected during the 
course of a pandemic and likely not show up for work while they are ill. During the peak 
flu month of October in Baltimore, Maryland, during the 1918 pandemic, one in four 
critical personnel failed to report for duty.52 “Civil servants, industrial workers, and 
operators of public utilities were unable to work, stricken with influenza themselves or 
nursing ill family members at home….All city hall departments reported understaffing. 
Fire companies functioned far short of their normal complement, with up to a third of 
uniformed members’ off-duty during the second week of October.”53 
Using the clinical attack rate as the planning participation rate, however, may be 
an underestimate.  Fire department employees may face a higher attack rate because of 
their anticipated increased exposure to flu patients. Fire fighters will respond to, and 
encounter with greater frequency than the normal, community members who already are 
sick and those who have no prior immunity to the virus.  While treating and transporting 
sick patients, fire fighters will face an elevated exposure rate and likely a higher 
probability of contracting the infectious disease.  
The experiences of health care workers during the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) epidemic offer some evidence of this greater risk resulting from care 
and treatment of patients. The first readily transmissible disease of this century emerged 
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in November 2002 in China’s Guangdong Providence.54 SARS spread relatively quickly 
to various regions around the globe, having a significant impact on various regions, cities, 
and health care systems. “Five probable SARS patients in Singapore were each linked to 
events resulting in the apparent infection of ten or more health care workers, family, or 
social contacts, or unrelated hospital visitors, accounting for 103 of the 205 probable 
SARS cases.”55 In Hong Kong, “ultimately, sixty-nine health workers and sixteen 
medical students developed SARS directly attributable to workplace exposure to the 
index case; the disease then spread to family members (and other contacts) of the affected 
workers.”56   
Fire fighters have not been included in any of these former studies.  Still, fire 
fighters within the NCR are likely to have an increased risk of contracting a virus for 
several reasons.  All of the fire fighters within the NCR are trained as emergency medical 
technicians, they are assigned to fire trucks dispatched to medical emergencies, and each 
individual performs or assists in providing advanced medical procedures in the field. As 
such, all fire fighters within the NCR will have an increased risk of exposure and likely 
will have an increased attack rate during a pandemic.57   
The potential exposure of fire fighters to a wide range of infected community 
members comes from a number of their routine activities.  Over the last few decades, fire 
incidents have deceased.  Nationwide less than 10 percent of the emergencies fire 
departments are called to actually involve fire.58 During this same time, fire departments 
have recognized that providing emergency medical services has become a priority.  As 
shown in Figure 1 below, the single most frequent task undertaken by fire fighters today 
involves medical and rescue responses.  Over 55 percent (55.2%) of the emergencies 
nationwide are medical and rescue in nature.59 
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Figure 1.   Fire Department Overall Runs by Incident Type (percent of runs, 2004)60 
Source: 2004 
 
The fire fighters within the NCR face the same challenges and all have some level 
of medical training. This allows fire departments to utilize all personnel and equipment to 
assist medical emergencies throughout the communities they serve.  Typically, fire 
departments throughout the NCR will dispatch a fire truck on all advanced life-support 
emergencies, or when they are the closest unit in any emergency. The primary reason fire 
trucks are dispatched on advance life-support calls is to assist ambulance or medic unit 
personnel with the triage, treatment, and transport of the patient.  
Fire fighters will assist in any number of ways, depending upon their level of 
medical training.  The pre-hospital care and procedures conducted in the field by fire 
department employees are quite advanced and often parallel procedures conducted in 
hospitals. Procedures such as intubation, nebulizer treatment, chest decompressions, 
cricothyroidotomy, administering intravenous fluids, and intraosseous access are 
advanced procedures that expose all treating fire department personnel to bodily fluids 
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contact was a factor in the increased attack rates for health care professionals. “Attack 
rates among workers with direct patient care roles have been observed as high as 10.0 and 
11.8% in Canada and Hong Kong, respectively.”61       
Although direct patient contact will likely increase the attack rates, a study by 
Mary Reynolds and others proved that non-clinical staff is susceptible to increased attack 
rates as well. During the SARS outbreak in Hanoi, for example, 19 percent of the cases 
were reported among Vietnamese non-clinical personnel, including housekeepers and 
other cleaning staff, kitchen staff, and receptionists.62 The SARS patient in this study was 
admitted to the hospital on February 26th, but it was not until March 6th that infection 
control practices were put into place. This is a likely reason for the high attack rates. But 
the study is important because it demonstrates the range of workers who may become 
infected simply by their proximity to an infected patient. 63 
Working within the context of increased exposure, the clinical disease attack rate 
for fire fighters should be higher than the average estimated in general population studies.  
If the rate is increased to 40 percent, the consequences can be dramatic.  A 30 percent 
clinical attack rate for the 7,597 fire fighters in the NCR projects that 2,279 will be 
infected with the flu virus during the course of a pandemic.  At a 40 percent attack rate, 
the estimate jumps to 3,039.  These additional 750 ill firefighters represent approximately 
two platoons of fire fighters for DCF&EMS, or the combined department personnel from 
Arlington, Alexandria, Manassas Park and Fairfax City. The impact of these rates of 
infection on the NCR fire departments is shown in Table 5 below.  In the smaller 
departments, such as Manassas Park, this level of infection nearly incapacitates the 
capability to provide any medical emergency response.  In the larger departments, the 
workforce will be dramatically reduced and the ability to serve the local community, let 
alone provide support to neighboring jurisdictions, will be severely constrained. 
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Table 5. Clinical Disease Attack Rates 
 








Alexandria City Fire 
Department 326 97.8 130.4 
Arlington County Fire 
Department 325 97.5 130 
City of Manassas Park Fire 
Department 25 7.5 10 
District of Columbia Fire and 
EMS Department 2017 605.1 806.8 
Fairfax City Fire Department 76 22.8 30.4 
Fairfax County Fire & Rescue 1619 485.7 647.6 
Fort Myer Fire Department 31 9.3 12.4 
Loudoun County Fire and 
Rescue 378 113.4 151.2 
Metropolitan Washington 
Airport Authority 133 39.9 53.2 
Montgomery County Fire & 
Rescue Service 1339 401.7 535.6 
Prince George's Fire & EMS 892 267.6 356.8 
Prince William County Dept 
Fire & Rescue 436 130.8 174.4 
Total 7,597 2,279.1 3,038.8 
 
Using either the 30 or 40 percent clinical disease attack rate as the core level of 
illness throughout the course of a pandemic obviously does not mean that everyone will 
be ill at the same time.  Depending on the cycles and severity of the virus, and the 
demographic characteristics of the neighboring population, the rate will vary 
considerably.  Although little can be done to influence the underlying attack rate, other 
influences on the ability and willingness of fire fighters to respond to an emergency are 
much more amenable to intervention and change.  According to Ran Balicer, a study of 
308 employees at three health departments in Maryland found that: 
Current national contingency plans account for possible personnel 
shortages within the healthcare and public health settings, mainly due to 
the expected influenza morbidity among workers. Yet our data suggest 
that regardless of the expected morbidity among personnel during an 
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influenza pandemic, nearly half of the local health department workers are 
likely not to report to duty during such an extreme public health crisis. In 
fact, most of the workers (and nearly three out of four technical/support 
workers) do not believe they will even be asked to report to work.64  
Outside of the clinical disease attack rate, then, there are numerous factors which 
affect fire fighters’ ability and willingness to participate in a pandemic. Independently, 
these factors will significantly impact fire fighter workforce levels. Although these issues 
will vary for each fire fighter, departments face planning for workforce levels that are 
affected by both an infection rate and broad social and personal conditions.  Fortunately, 
fire departments may be able to influence these social and personal conditions far more 
positively than the epidemiological rate of virus infection. 
B. WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION PERCENTAGE 
How can fire departments effectively plan or respond in a pandemic if there is no 
accurate estimation of the number of fire fighters who will be able and willing to work? 
Fire department personnel are the critical node for all fire department operations and even 
more so during a pandemic.  The capability of any fire department to provide emergency 
and non-emergency services to its community is primarily contingent upon adequate 
staffing levels.  
Although a variety of issues will collectively determine baseline workforce levels 
in an actual event, a reasonable estimate can be drawn from the available scientific data 
on past pandemics and data collected from this survey. Willingness and ability will be 
analyzed independently to examine the specific concerns fire fighters have with each. 
Willingness and ability will also be analyzed collectively to determine a WPP.  
Determining a fact-based WPP will assist fire departments in developing reasonable and 
practical pandemic plans. 
1. Baseline Willingness 
The survey asked a wide range of willingness questions on fire fighter’s ability to 
participate in a pandemic. To determine the baseline for willingness however, a single 
question was used: “In your current fire department position, would you be willing to 
participate in your fire department’s response to an avian influenza (bird flu) outbreak?” 
Just under sixty-nine percent (68.8%) of the respondents said that they were willing to 
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participate in a response to an avian influenza outbreak, with 22.1% saying they were 
“not sure.” Although 68.8% of the respondents said that they were willing to participate 
in a response to an avian influenza (bird flu) outbreak with their fire department, when 
asked to “rate their level of willingness,” great disparity emerges. 
Table 6 illustrates fire fighters’ level of willingness. The respondents were asked 
to rate their level of willingness; whereby a “1” would indicate not a very strong 
willingness to participate. A “10” would represent a strong willingness with no concern 
whatsoever about participating.  Only 11.1 percent of the respondents answered “10.” 
The majority of the respondents (38.6% ) answered “5,” suggesting that although they 
maybe willing to participate in an avian influenza outbreak, their level of concern was 
significant. The higher the level of concern, the less willing a fire fighter will be to 
participate in a pandemic. Although 68.8 percent of the fire fighters surveyed said they 
would be willing to participate in a pandemic, it is likely this number will be lower due to 
the average level of concern. 
 
Table 6. Rated Level of Willingness 
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2. Baseline Ability 
To determine a level of ability, that ability it must be measured against something. 
Although it may have been possible to ask fire fighters if they would be able to 
participate in a pandemic, it was deemed as too generic a question. There are many 
variables to one’s ability, such as child care, transportation, personal health issues, and 
the care of pets. The most telling indicator of a fire fighter’s ability to participate in a 
pandemic would come from a measurement of his or her ability to participate when an 
immediate family member is seriously ill.  The “immediate family member” allows for 
the greatest range of respondents, as this would likely have applicability to single and 
married fire fighters alike. The vast majority of fire fighters likely have someone they 
consider an “immediate” family member; conversely, not every fire fighter has 
dependents or living parents.      
Only 30.4 percent of the respondents said they would be able to work for their fire 
department during a pandemic if a member of their immediate family was seriously ill; 
27.2 percent said they would not be able and 42.5 percent said they were “not sure.” 
Overall, the respondents were asked to rate their level of ability to participate in a 
pandemic. Table 7 illustrates the fire fighter’s level of ability. A “1” means there are no 
factors affecting ability to participate; a “10” means there are a significant number of 
factors affecting ability to participate. Only 9.4 percent of the fire fighters said there were 
“no factors” affecting their ability to participate. The mean score was 4.18. This suggests 
that the majority of fire fighters have a couple of factors which will affect their ability to 
participate in a pandemic. The higher the score, the more likely fire fighters will not be 








Table 7. Rated Level of Ability 
 
A determination of the baseline willingness and ability participation rates is 
important for comparison reasons; however, further analysis and breakdown is necessary 
to get a detailed and accurate understanding of the variables associated with each. Only 
then can an accurate WPP be obtained. The following section will analyze in detail the 
variables impacting ability and willingness.  
3. Fire Fighters’ Willingness to Participate -- General 
As mentioned previously, just under 69 percent (68.8%) of fire department 
employees said they would be willing to participate in a response to an avian influenza 
(bird flu) outbreak. Although at first glance this appears to be a relatively high level of 
willingness for participation in a pandemic-like event, it is significantly lower than the 
willingness to participate in the more traditional fire department responses. The 
respondents were asked to rate their willingness to participate in four types of significant 
emergency responses: (1) an event similar to the Pentagon response on September 11, 
2001; (2) a hurricane; (3) a radiological/nuclear event; and (4) an avian influenza (bird 
flu) outbreak.  
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Over 95 percent of the fire fighters were willing to participate in a response 
similar to September 11, 2001(95.3%), with 95 percent willing to participate in a 
hurricane response.  The response rate for willingness to participate in a 
radiological/nuclear event was 69.7 percent, with 17.9 percent “not sure.” The response 
rate for willingness to participate in an avian influenza outbreak was 68.8 percent, with 
22.1 percent “not sure.” 
 
Table 8. Comparison of Percentage of Willingness Based on Type of Incident 
 
Incident Willing Not Willing Not Sure 
Similar to September 11, 2001 95.3 1.4 3.3 
Hurricane Response 95.0 2.3 2.7 
Radiological/Nuclear 69.7 12.4 17.9 
Pandemic 68.8 9.1 22.1 
 
This comparison provides greater insight and perspective on the willingness of 
fire fighters to participate in extreme and catastrophic emergencies. First, it demonstrates 
that fire fighters are largely not opposed to participating in certain types of major 
emergencies where the potential for death and injury is significant. Secondly, it shows the 
disparity in willingness to participate between classifications of emergencies. There are 
two reasons which may influence a fire fighter’s willingness to participate in a 
radiological or pandemic type event over a hurricane or Pentagon attack: (1) these 
responses are generally considered outside the traditional mission of the fire department 
and (2) the psychological fear of the unknown. These issues are discussed in greater 
detail in the following chapter. 
4. Variables to Willingness 
The survey further broke down the levels of fire fighters’ willingness to 
participate in a pandemic based on issues or variables identified in similar studies, 
discussions with fire fighters, pre-survey testing, and the hypotheses of the author. 
Qureshi’s study of health care workers found the reasons for not being willing to report to 
work during a catastrophic event were family, self, personal health problems, and child or 
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eldercare issues.65 The Shapira study determined the reasons affecting willingness to 
participate were: fear of leaving home, transportation difficulties, fear of opening the 
family’s sealed room, necessity of caring for their family, and vision problems due to 
inability to use glasses while wearing a gas mask.66 (Several of these reasons were 
specific to the circumstances of the Israeli hospital personnel and thus not applicable to 
this study.  
Balicer’s study found that the most influential construct associated with 
willingness to report to duty was “the perception of the importance of one’s role in the 
agency’s overall response.”67 It was determined that this issue was important but would 
be addressed separately from the willingness section of this survey.  
A final determination was then made as to which variables from these studies 
would be applicable to fire fighters’ willingness to participate in a pandemic. Utilizing 
these variables would allow for further comparison between studies of the individual 
factors affecting willingness.    
The following topics are used to assess fire fighters’ willingness to participate in a 
pandemic: family, personal protective equipment, fire department pandemic response 
plans, worker’s compensation, and pharmacological interventions (vaccine and anti-
viral).   
The safety of one’s family is consistently a primary concern of respondents in 
previous studies. Qureshi’s study of health care workers found that fear and concern for 
family was the primary reason respondents were not willing to report to work.68 In the 
study of the Israeli hospital personnel, 63 percent stated “necessity to care for their 
family” as one of the reasons for their unwillingness to work. Demme’s study on law 
enforcement’s role in responding to a biological incident found “that the safety of the 
family was paramount in determining whether to respond to work or not during a  
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biological related incident.”69 Schechter’s study on the medical reserve corps volunteers 
found that family health was the greatest concern regarding barriers to willingness to 
work in catastrophic disasters.70  
It is not surprising that concern for the safety of family is a primary factor in one’s 
willingness to participate in a pandemic. This study found that if an immediate family 
member was seriously ill during a pandemic, 32.2 percent of fire fighters were either “not 
willing” or “not at all willing” to work. Only 10.7 percent said they would be “very 
willing” to work. Likewise, if dependents were seriously ill during a pandemic, 34.9 
percent of the respondents were either “not willing” or “not at all willing” to work. Only 
6.9 percent said they would be “very willing” to work if a dependent were seriously ill.  
Sixty-four percent of the fire department employees said they were “not willing” 
or “not at all willing” to participate in a pandemic if adequate PPE was not provided 
during a pandemic. This was a significant finding in the study of Israeli hospital 
personnel as well. That study determined that if adequate safety measures were provided 
the willingness to report to duty would increase from 42 percent to 86 percent.71 The 
safety measures included a complete protective suit and spectacles suitable for a gas 
mask.72 
There is the expectation that sufficient PPE will be provided by (or through) the 
fire department to fire fighters in a pandemic. Over 63 percent (63.2%) of the respondents 
were either “confident” or “very confident” that their respective fire departments would 
provide sufficient PPE during a pandemic. Furthermore, 64.9 percent of FDE said 
providing adequate and sufficient PPE was critical for fire department pandemic 
preparedness. 
Several independent variables, not discussed in previous studies, were found to be 
particularly relevant to fire fighters’ willingness to work. These issues were determined 
primarily by the author as being important considerations for fire fighters specifically for 
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participation in a pandemic. These variables were substantiated in discussions with fire 
fighters and during the pre-survey analysis. The main independent variables are fire 
department pandemic plans, worker’s compensation coverage, and pharmacological 
interventions.  
Just under 40 percent (38.6%) of the respondents said they were “not willing” or 
“not at all willing” to participate in a pandemic if their fire department did not have a 
pandemic response plan. Nearly 75 percent (74.8) of the respondents believed having a 
fire department plan was “very important” or “critical.” Over seventy percent of the 
respondents indicated that if their respective department had a pandemic response plan, it 
would increase their willingness to participate in a pandemic; however, only 14.7 percent 
were familiar with their respective fire department’s pandemic operational plan; 63.2 
percent did not know their operational plans and 22.2 percent were unsure. 
Seventy-six percent of the fire department employees said they were “not willing” 
or “not at all willing” to participate in a pandemic if they were not covered under 
worker’s compensation for any illness contracted during a pandemic. Only 2.2 percent 
said they would be “very willing” to participate. Over 65 percent (65.4%) of the 
respondents believed worker’s compensation issues were “very important” or “critical.”  
Nearly 53 percent (52.8%) of the fire department employees said they were “not 
willing” or “not at all willing” to participate in a pandemic if vaccine or anti-viral 
medication were not available. Seventy-nine percent of the respondents believed vaccine 
and antiviral medications were “very important” or “critical.” 
There are additional considerations impacting fire fighters’ willingness to 
participate in a pandemic. These include outside employment, training and education, and 
a perception of one’s perception to overall operations. 
Almost 39 percent (38.6%) of the respondents indicated they had employment 
outside of their occupation with the fire department and more than 16 percent (16.2%) of 
the respondents indicated that this outside employment provided essential income. Since 
the respondents classified their secondary employment as essential, it is believed that this 
would likely have a greater impact on their willingness than ability. Fire fighters who  
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deemed their “outside” employment as essential may be less willing to participate with 
their fire departments in a pandemic because the income and/or benefits from this 
secondary employment is indispensable. 
Training is an important consideration as well and impacts the willingness of fire 
fighters to participate in a pandemic. Over 98 percent (98.2%) of the respondents 
indicated that pre-event training and preparation were “important” or “very important;” 
however, 58.1 percent of the fire department employees had received no fire department 
training or education for response to a pandemic. Only 3.9 percent of the fire department 
employees said they were “very knowledgeable” about pandemic flu. Nearly 38 percent 
(37.8%) said they were “knowledgeable” and 31.1 percent said they were either “not 
knowledgeable” or “not at all knowledgeable.” Just over 27 percent (27.3%) answered 
“neither” suggesting only a very basic understanding of pandemic flu.    
The perception of the importance of one’s role in a pandemic response was 
analyzed. The respondents were asked how significant a role they thought they would 
play in their department’s overall pandemic response. Nearly 50 percent (47.5%) 
believed they would play a significant role, with 10.1 percent responding “very 
significant.” Nearly 30 percent (27.3%) answered “neither” and 13.3 percent and 1.8 
percent said their role would be “not significant” or “not at all significant.”  
The highest percentage for those who believed their role was “very significant” in 
a department’s pandemic response were in the position of chief and assistant chief. It is 
interesting to note that a greater percentage of civilian-support staff believed their role 
was “very significant,” as compared to fire fighter/EMTs, fire fighter paramedics, 
lieutenants, and station commanders. However, civilian-support staff also had the highest 
percentage in the “not at all significant” category with 10.6 percent. No one above the 
rank of fire fighter/paramedic believed their role was “not at all significant.” The majority 
of the respondents within each group believed that they played a “significant” role in a 




Table 9. Perception of the Importance of One’s Role in a Pandemic Response 
 
  
5. Willingness Summary 
Although 68.8 percent of the respondents said they would be willing to participate 
in a pandemic response, significantly lower numbers resulted when specific questions on 
willingness were presented. Likewise, the results from the rated level of willingness 
question suggest that fire fighters may not be as willing to participate.  The wide range of 
variables associated with willingness resulted in great variation in fire fighters’ 
willingness to participate. This suggests that fire fighters’ willingness to participate in a 




C. ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE – GENERAL 
Ability to work is significantly different from willingness to work. Although 
individuals may be willing to participate in a particular event or scenario, independent 
factors or variables may prevent, minimize, or altogether not allow their participation. To 
assist in validating the independent ability factors which may affect fire fighters, a review 
of previous studies was conducted. Qureshi’s study of health care workers’ ability to 
report to duty during catastrophic disasters found that the primary reasons health care 
workers would not be able to report to work were “transportation issues (33.4%), 
childcare (29.1%), personal health concerns (14.9%), eldercare responsibilities (10.7%), 
pet care (7.8%) and second job obligations (2.5%).”73 A different study conducted by 
Qureshi found the main barriers to nurses reporting to work during an emergency were 
child/elder care obligations, transportation, and personal health issues.74 Although 
transportation and personal health concerns were significant reasons in the Qureshi study, 
they will not be addressed in the ability section of this study. It was believed, and 
confirmed in this study, that transportation would not be a significant hindrance for fire 
fighters within the NCR, as it would be for health care worker’s living and working in 
New York City. This study found that over 99.6 percent of the fire fighters use a personal 
vehicle as their primary method of transportation.   
The personal health concerns in this study were addressed separately in a 
“concern” section (discussed later in this chapter). It is believed that personal health 
concerns would impact fire fighters’ willingness to participate in a pandemic more than 
their ability. As a result, fire fighters’ ability to participate in a pandemic was measured 
against the following variables: seriously ill immediate family member, seriously ill 
parent or sibling, seriously ill child or other dependent, and pets. 
As discussed previously, the best gauge of a fire fighter’s ability to participate in a 
pandemic would come from a measurement of his or her ability to participate when there 
is an immediate family member who is seriously ill.  The “immediate family member”  
 
 
                                                 
73 Qureshi, Health Care Workers’ Ability, 383. 
74 Qureshi, et al., “Emergency Preparedness Training for Public Health Nurses,” 415. 
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allows for the greatest range of respondents, as the vast majority of fire fighters likely 
have someone they consider an “immediate” family member; conversely, not every fire 
fighter has dependents or living parents.      
Only 30.4 percent of the respondents said they would be able to work for their fire 
department during a pandemic if a member of their immediate family was seriously ill; 
27.2 percent said they would not be able and 42.5 percent said they were “not sure.”   
This was broken down further by asking the respondents if they would be able to 
work if their parents or siblings were ill and or children and other dependents. The reason 
for this distinction was to attempt to separate the significant family relationships between 
the younger, typically unmarried, fire department members from the older married ones. 
The thought being that the younger members who were not married with children would 
be more concerned with the health and safety of their parents and siblings, and so be less 
inclined to participate should they become ill. Of the survey respondents, 20.2 percent 
were not married and had no children. When comparing this group against single with 
children, married with no children, married with children, and others, there was not a 
significant difference in ability to participate.  
Overall, 50.5 percent of the respondents indicated they would be able to 
participate during a pandemic if their parents or siblings were seriously ill; 16 percent 
said they would not be able and 33.6 percent were “not sure.” There was more than 20 
percent (20.1%) increase in ability to participate between seriously ill “immediate” 
family member and a seriously ill parent or sibling. A possible reason for this increase is 
parents and siblings are likely functioning adults who do not require the assistance of the 
fire department employee; in contrast to an immediate family member, who is likely to be 
a spouse or dependent child.  
Out of all the variables possibly impacting the ability of fire fighter participation, 
it is believed that being responsible for children or “other dependents” would result in the 
lowest participation rates, if these dependents were seriously ill. Nearly 53 percent 
(52.9%) of the respondents were responsible for children. Over 14 percent (14.1%) were 
responsible for elders and 66.9 percent were responsible for pets. Just over 5 percent 
(5.5%) were responsible for physically or mentally disabled people.  
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When asked if they would be able to work for their fire department during a 
pandemic, if their child(ren) or other dependents were seriously ill, only 16.1 percent 
answered “yes.” Nearly 35 percent (34.7%) answered “no,” with 26.2 percent answering 
“not sure.” Nearly a quarter (23.2%) of the respondents indicated that the question was 
not applicable to them.  
Although 74 percent of the respondents indicated they were responsible for pets, 
this factor did not impact ability to participate significantly.  Of those responsible for 
pets, 89.5 percent indicated they would be able to work during a pandemic, 2.6 percent 
answered “no,” and 7.9 percent were “not sure.” 
Additional considerations affecting fire fighters’ ability to participate include 
childcare and a spouse or partner having to work during a pandemic. Childcare is a 
particularly important consideration for fire fighters when assessing ability to participate 
during a pandemic for two primary reasons: the anticipated extended work hours and the 
unique work schedule of most fire fighters. Although all fire department employees were 
surveyed within each jurisdiction, the vast majority (74.5%) work a twenty-four-hour 
shift. Shift-work posses unique challenges for finding childcare under normal 
circumstances, much less during a pandemic, when fire departments may require or need 
employees to work extended hours to cover personnel shortages.   
The fire department employees were asked if they anticipated having 
childcare/dependent care issues for an event requiring their extended participation. After 
adjusting for the 19.8 percent of respondents who indicated that child/dependant care was 
“not applicable” to their current situation (likely because they had no children or those 
children were grown), 26.1 percent believed child/dependent care would be an issue. 
Although 58.5 percent said this would not be an issue, 15.6 percent were unsure. Nearly 
42 percent (41.7%) of the fire department employees were certain or not sure that 
child/dependant care would be an issue if they were required to participate for an 
extended period of time.  
Having a spouse or partner who would have to report to work during a pandemic 
would certainly impact, in most circumstances, one’s own ability to participate. This is 
particularly true when other variable exists such as children, pets, or dependant parents. 
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Even without these variables, ordinary daily responsibilities must be addressed between 
couples; paying bills, home-care issues, and personal issues do not disappear.  
Over 27 percent (27.2%) of the respondents said their spouse or partner would 
have to report to work during a pandemic, epidemic, or biological event, with another 
19.5 percent responding they were “unsure.”  With over a quarter of the fire department 
employees’ spouses having to report to work during a pandemic, this will certainly 
impact the ability of the fire fighter to work.  
D. SUMMARY OF ABILITY 
Only 30.4 percent of those surveyed affirmatively responded that they would be 
able to participate in a pandemic if a member of their immediate family member was 
seriously ill. Although this is believed to be the best measure of ability, several other 
factors will influence one’s ability to participate in a pandemic. Collectively, these 
variables determine an individual’s overall ability to participate. Is impossible to 
determine definitively, from this survey, an individual’s ability to participate in a 
pandemic response. However, in analyzing the number of variables affecting one’s ability 
to participate, we can infer that the greater the number of variables, the less likely 
individuals will be able to participate in a pandemic. As was stated previously, only 9.4 
percent of the fire fighters said there were “no factors” affecting their ability to 
participate in a pandemic. The mean score on factors affecting ability to participate was 
4.18. Consequently, there are a number of factors affecting fire fighters’ ability to 
participating in a pandemic. These variations must be analyzed along with the variations 
in willingness as this interaction will provide a greater understanding and perspective of 
what challenges a pandemic poses to fire fighter participation. 
E. INTERACTION BETWEEN WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY 
This section will first discuss how the respondents were categorized based on 
their responses to the core questions on ability and willingness. Second, an analysis will 
be conducted of the general categories of willing, able, and unsure and the distribution of 
the respondents thereof. Lastly, a detailed discussion will examine the interaction 
between the three categories. 
To best analyze the interaction between willingness and ability it was determined 
that the survey respondents should be grouped into one of nine categories: willing and 
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able; willing, but not able; not willing, but able; not willing and not able; willing and not 
sure; not willing and not sure; not sure willing but able; not sure willing and not able; and 
not sure and not willing. The classification was determined based upon the respondents’ 
answers to the core questions on ability and willingness: questions 32 (willing) and 39 
(able).  Respondents who answer they were willing for question 32 and able for question 
39 received a 1 in the new variable, denoting "willing and able." Those who answered 
willing for 32 and not able for 39 received a 2 in the new variable, denoting "willing and 
not able."  Those who answered not willing for 32 and able for 39 received a 3 in the new 
variable, denoting "not willing and able."  Those who answered not willing for 32 and not 
able for 39 received a 4 in the new variable, denoting "not willing and not able."  Those 
who answered willing for 32 and not sure for 39 received a 5 in the new variable, 
denoting "willing and not sure."  Those who answered not willing for 32 and not sure for 
39 received a 6 in the new variable, denoting "not willing and not sure." Those who 
answered not sure for 32 and able for 39 received a 7 in the new variable, denoting "not 
sure on willing, but able." Those who answered not sure for 32 and not able for 39 
received an 8 in the new variable, denoting "not sure on willing and not able." Those who 
answered not sure for both 32 and 39 received a 9 in the new variable, denoting "not sure 
on willing and not sure on able." Those who answered only one of the two questions (32 
or 39) and left the other blank received a 98 in the new variable.  Those who answered 
neither 32 nor 39 received a 99 in the new variable. 
Table 10 illustrates the breakdown of the categorization. One hundred and forty-
six of the respondents could not be categorized into one of these nine groups because 
they either answered only one of the two questions, or they did not answer either of the 
two questions. Over 6 percent (6.9%) of the 873 respondents only answered one of the 
questions and another 9.9 percent failed to answered either question. The remaining 727 
respondents could be classified.  
The following discusses how the willingness and ability classifications were 
distributed. Nearly 60 percent (57.7%) of the respondents indicated they were “willing” 
to participate in an avian influenza outbreak. Over 7 percent (7.5%) said they were “not 
willing” and 17.9 percent said they were “not sure.” The ability classifications were 
broken down as well, into the following categories: able, not able, and not sure. Just over 
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25 percent (25.3%) indicated they would be “able” to work, 22.6 percent said they were 
“not able,” and 35.28 percent indicated they were “not sure.”   
 
Table 10. Classification of Respondents 
 
 ABLE NOT ABLE NOT SURE ABILITY TOTALS 






























An analysis of the interaction between willingness and ability is significant 
because it shows that a significant portion of fire fighters are unsure of their ability or 
willingness to work during a pandemic. This suggests that fire fighter participation may 
largely be dependent upon the situation they are presented with. Of the 17.9 percent of 
respondents who answered “not sure” regarding their willingness, 2.6 percent were 
“able” to work, 5.6 percent were “not able,” and 9.7 percent were “not sure” on their 
ability to work. Of the 35.2 percent who indicated they were “not sure” on their ability to 
work, 22.9 percent said that they would be “willing,” 2.6 percent said they would be “not 
willing,” and again 9.7 percent indicated they were “not sure” on their willingness.  
The largest percentage of respondents (22.9%) who indicated they were “not 
sure” were categorized as “willing, but not sure” on their ability to participate. In 
contrast, only 2.6 percent indicated they were “able, but unsure” on their willingness. 
The large portion of respondents who indicated they were unsure of their 
willingness and/or ability to participate in a pandemic is a positive finding because 
conceivably these individuals can be influenced; they have are not committed to not 
being able or willing to participate. However, when additional analysis was conducted 
between the categorical response generated from the core questions and other willingness 
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and ability questions, inconsistency in the respondents’ answers was prevalent. This 
further demonstrates that fire fighter participation rates will be situationally dependent.  
One would presume that fire department employees categorized as both willing 
and able would be likely to participate in a pandemic given any situation or circumstance. 
One hundred and eighty-seven of the respondents stated affirmatively that they would be 
both willing and able to participate in a pandemic. However, when their responses are 
analyzed against other willingness questions, some interesting findings emerge. Twelve 
(5.8%) of these 187 respondents indicated that they would not be willing to participate if 
an immediate family member was seriously ill. Likewise, fourteen (7.5%) said they 
would not be willing if a dependent was seriously ill. Over 36 percent (36.1%) said they 
were “not at all willing” or “not willing” if adequate PPE was not provided. One hundred 
and twenty five (42.1%) of the respondents said they were “not at all willing” or “not 
willing” to participate if they were not covered under worker’s compensation. Just over 
14 percent (14.3) were “not at all willing” to participate if vaccines and antivirals were 
not available.  
Analyzing the “not willing and not able” category also shows inconsistencies. 
Although the discrepancies are not as significant as in the “willing and able” category, 
the number of respondents classified as “not willing and not able” was significantly less. 
The thirty-two respondents answered definitively that they would not be willing to 
participate in their fire department’s response to an avian influenza outbreak and they 
would not be able to work if a member of their immediate family was seriously ill. One 
would suspect that, for this group, no variance would be found when asked additional 
questions on ability and willingness. However, when asked if they would be willing to 
participate if their dependent were seriously ill, 8.33% of this group indicated they would 
be willing. One of the respondents in this group said they would be willing even if 
adequate PPE was not provided. Six percent of these respondents said they would be 
willing if their fire department did not have a pandemic plan. It appears that although a 
fire fighter responded that he or she would be not willing and not able to participate in a 
pandemic, this may not be the case.  
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1. Summary of Interaction between Willingness and Ability  
The discrepancies and inconsistencies found in fire fighters’ answers regarding 
their ability and willingness to participate in a pandemic demonstrate that participation 
will be situationally dependent. The complexity of a pandemic and magnitude of 
variables that come into play do not allow for a relatively simple categorization of fire 
fighters. Likewise, asking fire fighters if they would be willing or able to participate in a 
pandemic is far to general and basic a question; it does not allow for the situation, and 
variables affecting the situation, to be placed into context. 
Fire fighters will determine their availability during a pandemic based on their 
particular situation and circumstance. The rated level of willingness questions support 
this assessment. Again, fire fighters suggested that there were fairly significant numbers 
of factors impacting their overall willingness and ability to participate in a pandemic. 
Although fire fighters said they may be willing or able to participate in a pandemic, only 
a very small portion said there were no factors affecting this decision. In fact, 11.1 
percent of the respondents said there were no factors affecting their willingness and only 
9.4 percent said there were no factors affecting their ability. For the overwhelming 
majority of fire fighters there are various issues and concerns associated with their 
participation in a pandemic. One of the consequences of this finding is that a specific 
WPP cannot be obtained – it is possible only to provide a range.     
F. DETERMINING THE WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION PERCENTAGE 
The WPP is the number of fire fighters who will be able and willing to participate 
during a pandemic. The WPP for fire fighters in a pandemic will be between 30 and 70 
percent. This range was determined using the core questions on ability and willingness. 
For ability, 30.4 percent of the fire department employees said definitively they would be 
able to work for their department in a pandemic if an immediate family member was 
seriously ill. This percentage is used to define the lower range of the WWP. At a 
minimum, fire departments should expect a third of their membership to participate. 
There is, however, room to improve this percentage, as 42.5 percent were “not sure” of 
their ability to work during a pandemic.  
At the high end of the WPP, 70 percent was determined from the 68.8 percent of 
the respondents who said that they would be willing to participate in an avian influenza 
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outbreak. This percentage has room for improvement as well because 22.1 percent 
answered “not sure.” However, caution is recommended in adjusting the estimated WPP 
upward, due to the rated level of willingness.  
As a planning assumption fire departments should anticipate a WPP between 30 
and 70 percent, over and above the clinical attack rates. Fire departments should 
anticipate higher participation rates if more of the fire fighters’ issues and concerns have 
been addressed. For example, fire departments that have stockpiled sufficient quantities 
of PPE and initiated department-wide pandemic training can use a higher WPP for their 
planning assumptions than departments who have done nothing in these areas.  
The WPP can be influenced through a number of initiatives, discussed in the 
following chapter, but first it is necessary to identify what initiatives or concerns, if 
addressed, will influence the participation rates of fire fighters. It is imperative that fire 
departments understand that their efforts will positively affect fire fighters’ willingness 
and ability to participate. 
1. Factors Which Would Influence Fire Fighters’ Participation  
Fire department employees were asked a series to questions to determine if their 
willingness to participate in a pandemic could be positively influenced. The questions 
specifically addressed the following areas: family, dependent care, pandemic response 
plans, worker’s compensation, and vaccines and antivirals. The questions only addressed 
whether it would increase the willingness to participate, not the ability. This is a potential 
weakness in this study; however, several of the questions asked do relate directly to 
ability and the answers likely reflect ability as well as willingness.  
Over 80 percent (83.1%) said if assistance were provided to their family, it would 
increase their willingness to participate. The type of assistance was not specifically 
identified, which may suggest that any type of assistance would increase willingness. 
Suggestions on providing assistance to families are discussed in the following chapter; 
however, it is recommended that further analysis is conducted on the types of family 
assistance which would be most beneficial to fire fighters. For every question, over 70 
percent of the respondents suggested their willingness to participate would increase if 
specific issues and concerns were addressed. Nearly 80 percent (79.1%) said if dependent 
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care issues were taken care of their willingness to participate would increase. Over 70 
percent (70.8%) said their willingness would increase if their fire department had a 
pandemic response plan. Almost 80 percent (77.9%) indicated their willingness would 
increase if they were covered under worker’s compensation for any illness they received 
while participating in a pandemic response with their fire department. Nearly 90 percent 
(87.7%) said their willingness would increase if vaccines and antivirals were available. 
Additionally, over 85 percent (85.2%) said their willingness to participate in a pandemic 
would increase if antivirals and vaccines were provided to their families. 
G. SUMMARY 
These areas provide the foundation for recommendations on improving the WPP. 
As was determined in this chapter, these issues cannot be addressed independently in the 
hopes of increasing the WPP. Because the variables associated with willingness and 
ability are situationally dependent and vary for each fire department employee, many 
different areas must be addressed. The core areas which are likely to influence fire fighter 
ability and willingness to participate in a pandemic are categorized and discussed in 
detail in the following chapter.   
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter will focus primarily on the core areas on which fire departments 
should focus their efforts to improve fire fighters’ ability and willingness to participate in 
a pandemic, with the goal of increasing the WPP. First, a discussion of the psychological 
impact on fire fighters responding to a pandemic will ensue. This will assist in putting 
many of the fears associated with responding to “unknown” events into perspective and 
give greater credence to the recommendations. Next, fundamental planning assumptions 
for a pandemic will be discussed. Lastly, the five central issues impacting fire fighters’ 
ability and willingness to participate in a pandemic will be presented. Recommendations 
will also be provided, specific to each issue, to improve the overall WPP. 
A. PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON FIRE FIGHTERS RESPONDING TO 
THE “UNKNOWN” 
The fear of the “unknown” will have a significant impact on fire fighters just as it 
has on the general public. Although the psychological impacts have not been sufficiently 
studied within the fire service community, sufficient evidence exists, from which 
correlations can be drawn, in studies conducted of the general population. In comparing 
the tangible impacts (actual deaths and injuries) verses the intangible (the psychological 
consequences) of emergencies and disasters, the intangibles far out number the tangibles. 
“History suggests that there may be many more psychological victims than physical 
victims in a terrorist attack.”75 This was the case for the September 11th and anthrax 
attacks in 2001. The psychological casualties far outnumbered those directly involved in 
the actual incidents.  
These psychological consequences will be magnified not only for the general 
public, but for fire fighters in emergencies or incidents involving infectious diseases, 
radiation, or any other “unknown” event. An “unknown” can be defined as an incident 
where there is no defined “response area.” There is a general lack of knowledge or 
understanding; the main source, cause, or threat can not be seen, felt, or defined; and the 
potential health consequences are significant. The threat of terrorism and the H5N1 
                                                 
75 Robyn Pangi, "After the Attack: The Psychological Consequences of Terrorism," Perspectives on 
Preparedness, no. 7 (August, 2002), 1, http://www.mipt.org/pdf/ksg_popno7.pdf (accessed January 12, 
2008).  
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(avian flu) virus has increased both awareness and the likelihood of fire fighters 
throughout the U.S. having to deal with incidents with “unknown” characteristics. The 
fear associated with these “unknown” events will reduce the willingness of fire fighters to 
participate, if and when they occur.  
A major factor in fire fighters’ willingness to participate in any emergency or 
incident involves their perceptions prior to joining the fire service. Sixty-three percent of 
the survey respondents indicated that, at the time they joined the fire service, they never 
anticipated responding to an event similar to the Pentagon attack. Just over 35 percent 
(35.2%) never anticipated participating in a hurricane response. Fifty-three percent said 
they never anticipated responding to a radiological or nuclear event and 60 percent never 
anticipated having to participate in a pandemic, epidemic, or biological event.  
The survey data was then analyzed based on the date of hire. For each incident, 
with the exception of a hurricane, those hired before 2000 had a significantly higher 
percentage (of not having anticipated responding to these events) than those hired after 
2001.  
 
Table 11. Never Anticipated Responding Prior to Joining the Fire Department: 
 
Types of Responses Hired 1965-2000 Hired 2001-2007 
Pentagon Attack 70% 26% 
Hurricane 36% 31% 
Radiological/Nuclear 56% 41% 
Pandemic/Epidemic/Biological 66% 30% 
 
The events of September 11, 2001 raised awareness in those joining the fire 
service that fire departments will play a role in these types of events. Consequently, fire 
fighters who joined after 2001 may be more willing to participate in such response 
because they anticipated this responsibility and possible eventuality prior to joining their  
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respective departments. Although there was not a significant distinction in willingness to 
participate in these emergencies for those hired before and after 2001, further discussion 
and study would be worthwhile. 
Fire fighters are likely more willing to participate in responding to a hurricane or 
an event similar to the attack on the Pentagon primarily because of the seeming lack of 
health consequences associated with these events. Additionally, although these events are 
atypical emergencies, they utilize traditional fire fighting and emergency response tactics 
and training. Overall, fire fighters are more willing to participate in response to these 
more “traditional” emergencies than to a radiological or influenza incident. Over 95 
percent (95.3%) of the fire fighters said they would be willing to participate in a response 
similar to the Pentagon attack and 95 percent said they would be willing to participate in 
a hurricane response. Conversely, only 69.7 percent of the fire fighters said they would 
be willing to participate in a radiological/nuclear event and 68.8 percent said they would 
be willing to participate in an avian influenza outbreak. There was not a significant 
distinction in willingness to participate in these emergencies for those hired before 2001 
and those hired later.   
The vast majority of emergency response situations throughout the United States 
have defined boundaries, whether it is a hurricane, heart attack victim, or gasoline leak. 
The parameters can be drawn and the hazard zones designated, either formally or 
informally. This is psychologically important for fire fighters because it defines the 
hazard, which consequently means there is a defined safe area where refuge can be found.  
For “unknown” incidents there are no boundaries and, consequently, there are no safe 
areas; potentially, everyone or everything is contaminated. “The psychological 
consequences, particularly when the rescue worker may be putting his or her life at risk 
by entering a contaminated area, can be extreme.”76 The contaminated area is not clearly 
defined for radiological and infectious diseases; as a result the psychological 
consequences will be magnified, whether or not there is a risk to life. 
Fire fighters generally have limited knowledge or understanding of these 
“unknown” events because they have not been trained or provided education. The 
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psychological consequences of having inadequate information for these incidents are 
significant. “In the aftermath of … terrorist attacks, the intensity of responders’ work, the 
long duration of the response campaigns, the multiplicity of risks, the horrifying 
outcomes of the attacks, and the lack of knowledge about hazards all contributed to 
stress.” 
The health consequences associated with unknown events likely create the 
greatest anxiety. This is particularly true for radiological and infectious disease incidents. 
The short- and long-term health consequences of radiation exposure are uncertain and the 
delayed signs and symptoms from exposure to flu victims will certainly create more 
anxiety. Fire fighters may never know if their exposure will result in cancer or death from 
radiological incidents and may not know for days if they have contracted the flu virus. 
This anxiety is perhaps the single greatest reason affecting the willingness of fire fighters 
to participate in these emergencies. 
There is significant data available on the health impacts of natural disasters, but 
“there is almost no data on the mental health impacts of outbreaks of disease.”77 The 
SARS epidemics in Asia and Canada provides the most recent information on mental 
health consequences from outbreaks of disease. Analyzing the mental health impacts on 
the general population and health care workers will provide insight to the potential effect 
on fire fighters of participating in an infectious disease emergency. During the SARS 
outbreak “upwards of 40% of the community population experienced increased stress in 
family and work settings…[and] 16% showed signs of traumatic stress levels…Studies of 
the nurses who treated SARS patients indicated high levels of stress and about 11% rates 
of traumatic stress reactions, including depression, anxiety, hostility and somatization 
symptoms.”78  
Fire fighters will be needed to treat and transport victims during an infectious 
disease outbreak. It is anticipated that the number of victims requiring advance medical 
assistance and intervention during an outbreak will increase appreciably. As such, all 
                                                 
77 Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress, Mental Health and Behavioral Guidelines for Response to 
Pandemic Flu Outbreak (Bethesda, MD: Center for the Study of Traumatic Stress, n.d.), 1, 
http://www.usuhs.mil/psy/CSTSPandemicAvianInfluenza.pdf (accessed January 12, 2008).   
78 Ibid.   
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medical personnel (including fire fighters) will have a higher probability of contracting 
an infectious disease due to this increased exposure. This, in addition to the delayed onset 
of disease, will reduce fire fighters’ willingness to participate.  
There are many similarities between infectious disease and radiological 
emergencies, allowing for comparisons to be drawn in the analysis of the 
health impacts. Radiological emergencies create significant anxiety 
because of the uncertainty associated with the health consequences. In 
September of 1987 in Goiania, Chile, two people unknowingly 
disassembled a cesium-137 teletherapy unit that was left behind after a 
private radiotherapy institute moved away. The radiological source was 
unintentionally spread and shared. Once discovered, the psychological 
impact on the general population was noteworthy. Perhaps the most 
important finding in examining the Goiania event, however, was the fact 
that of the first 60,000 individuals to be monitored, approximately 5,000 
(8.3%) presented acute stress or allergic symptoms (i.e. rash around neck 
and upper body, vomiting, diarrhea, etc.). Curiously, the majority of these 
individuals claimed that these symptoms had begun after the capsule was 
broken but before the announcement in the news media. Not a one of these 
individuals was contaminated! This has profound implications for the 
study of perceived risk in general and “special” nuclear-related impacts in 
particular.79 
Another study examined the impact of radiation exposure on clean-up workers 
from Estonia during the Chernobyl nuclear emergency. The report found that suicide was 
the leading cause of death among these workers. “These findings suggest the strong 
influence on mental health of uncertainty about long-term health effects of exposure to 
radiation.”80 Not only does this have implications for fire fighters’ willingness to 
participate during the event, but it has absolute implications for the long-term 
psychological treatment and care of fire fighters. 
The psychological implications of a pandemic will greatly influence fire fighter 
participation rates. This fire service mission brings with it new concerns and issues for 
fire fighters that, if not effectively addressed, will allow fear and anxiety to metastasize. 
In addressing the five core areas of concern fire fighters’ have regarding participating in a 
pandemic, fire departments will reduce the fear and anxiety and increase the participation                                                  
79 John S. Petterson, "Perception Vs. Reality of Radiological Impact: The Goiania Model," Nuclear 
News 31, no. 14 (November, 1988), 89. 
80 Gloria R. Leon, "Overview of the Psychosocial Impact of Disasters," Prehospital and Disaster 
Medicine 19, no. 1 (January-March, 2004), http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu/19-
1%20pdfs/Leon%20Overview.pdf (accessed January 8, 2008), 6-7. 
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rates. To effectively do this, the discussion must first be put into the context of 
established planning assumptions. These assumptions provide the framework for the 
general consequences and impact of the pandemic and provide perspective for the 
recommendations. 
B. OVERVIEW OF GENERAL PANDEMIC PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS 
The ultimate impact and exact consequences of the next pandemic can not be 
fully determined prior to its occurrence. Although the consequences will certainly be 
significant, pandemic experts and planners must develop and use assumptions for 
planning purposes. These assumptions are primarily based upon the three pandemics 
which occurred in the 20th century (1918, 1957, 1968).  Both the 1957 and 1968 
pandemics have been classified as “moderate” pandemics, with the 1918 pandemic 
classified as “severe”81 “This difference is largely related to the severity of infections and 
the virulence of the influenza viruses that caused the pandemic.”82 However,  
[The] Medical Planning Resources and the former director of medical 
contingency operations for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, explained: “The 
impact of a pandemic now could be significantly worse due to three important changes: 
(1) a tripling of the global human population, creating a significantly larger ‘population-
at-risk’; (2) large geographic concentrations of immunocompromised populations due to 
HIV, straining the medical and public health infrastructure; and (3) the availability of a 
vast global air transportation network, creating a potential ‘vector accelerant’ (or 
exponentially rapid) platform for the spread of the disease.” 83 Regardless, establishing a 
foundation for planning assumptions is necessary. It is essential that these assumptions be 
revisited regularly as new data and circumstance become available.  
The Department of Health and Human Services’ Pandemic Response Plan 
contains several key planning assumptions, based on the previous pandemics, which are  
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used for pandemic planning. These assumptions are critical as they give perspective on 
the potential consequences faced within the fire service.  The following assumptions are 
from DHHS’s Pandemic Response Plan: 
■ Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza subtype will be universal. 
■ The clinical disease attack rate will be 30 percent in the overall population. 
Illness rates will be highest among school-aged children (about 40%) and 
decline with age. Among working adults, an average of 20 percent will 
become ill during a community outbreak. 
■ Of those who become ill with influenza, 50 percent will seek outpatient medical 
care. 
■ The number of hospitalizations and deaths will depend on the virulence of the 
pandemic virus. Estimates differ about ten-fold between more and less 
severe scenarios. Because the virulence of the influenza virus that causes 
the next pandemic cannot be predicted, two scenarios are presented based 
on extrapolation of past pandemic experience (Table 12). 
 
Table 12. Number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Death 
Associated with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenarios* 
 
Characteristics Moderate (1958/68-like) Severe (1918-like) 
Illness 90 million (30%) 90 million (30%) 
Outpatient medical care 45 million (50%) 45 million (50%) 
Hospitalization 865,000 9,900,000 
ICU care 128,750 1,485,000 
Mechanical ventilation 64,875 742,500 
Deaths 209,000 1,903,000 
*Estimates based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the United States. Note that these 
estimates do not include the potential impact of interventions not available during the 20th century 
pandemics.84 
                                                 
84 DHHS, HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, 18. 
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■ Risk groups for severe and fatal infections cannot be predicted with certainty. 
During annual fall and winter influenza season, infants and the elderly, 
persons with chronic illnesses and pregnant women are usually at higher 
risk of complications from influenza infections. In contrast, in the 1918 
pandemic, most deaths occurred among young, previously healthy adults. 
■ The typical incubation period (the time between acquiring the infection until 
becoming ill) for influenza averages two days. We assume this would be 
the same for a novel strain that is transmitted between people by 
respiratory secretions. 
■ Persons who become ill may shed the virus and can transmit infection for one-
half to one day before the onset of illness. Viral shedding and the risk for 
transmission will be greatest during the first two days of illness. Children 
will shed the greatest amount of virus and, therefore are likely to pose the 
greatest risk for transmission. 
■ On average, two secondary infections will occur as a result of transmission 
from someone who is ill. Some estimates from past pandemics have been 
higher, with up to three secondary infections per primary case. 
■ In an affected community, a pandemic outbreak will last approximately six to 
eight weeks. At least two pandemic disease waves are likely. Following 
the pandemic, the new viral subtype is likely to continue circulating and to 
contribute to seasonal influenza. 
■ The seasonality of a pandemic cannot be predicted with certainty. The largest 
waves in the U.S. during 20th century pandemics occurred in the fall and 
winter. The pattern of the 1957 pandemic may be instructive in that the 
first U.S. cases occurred in June but no community outbreaks occurred 
until August and the first wave of illness peaked in October. 85 
 
These assumptions should be incorporated into pandemic planning on every level, 
as they provide a valuable perspective on the potential consequences of a pandemic. 
                                                 
85 DHHS, HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, 18-19. 
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Specifically for the fire service, these assumptions are important in determining fire 
fighter workforce participation levels and developing fire department pandemic response 
plans. For example, knowing that a pandemic will last between twelve and sixteen weeks 
becomes a fundamental planning parameter for determining PPE stockpiling 
requirements. These assumptions, along with the survey data, will be used to support and 
discuss the recommendations throughout this chapter.   
C. REASONS TO IMPROVE WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION  
Fire departments have a vested interest in improving workforce participation 
levels – to maximize the services that can be provided to the community. Without 
adequate manpower, services will have to be reduced and/or cut. Fire (and police) 
departments, perhaps more than most businesses, agencies or services, have a 
responsibility to ensure that, within reason, these services are continued during any 
emergency. The primary way to ensure that these services are continued and maximized 
is to make certain an adequate workforce is available.  Fire departments need to have a 
clear understanding of the extent to which their workforce will be available. The Shapira 
study noted that “knowledge of the extent to which hospitals can rely upon personnel 
willing to report to their planned duties is a key operational consideration in hospital staff 
management during a prolonged potentially unconventional war.”86 While a valid reason 
to commit to these initiatives would be to increase participation levels, a more 
fundamental reason exists: a duty to protect our fire fighters.  
1. Recommendations on Improving Fire Fighter Participation  
There are five core areas on which fire departments within the National Capital 
Region should focus their attention to improve fire fighters’ ability and willingness to 
participate in a pandemic. These issues were identified through the survey and were then 
categorized into the following areas: family, training and education, pharmaceutical 
interventions, worker’s compensation, and personal protective equipment. For each of 
these areas, a discussion will ensue as to why they are important; how they will impact 
fire fighters’ ability and willingness to participate in a pandemic; and what fire 
departments can do to address them.  
 
                                                 
86 Aspira et al., Willingness of Staff to Report 709. 
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a. Family Issues 
As shown in this and other surveys of professional groups, the safety and 
security of family is of paramount importance to emergency responders.  The Qureshi 
study found “the most frequently cited reason for employees’ unwillingness to report to 
duty during a disaster was fear and concern for the safety of their families and 
themselves.”87 Demme’s thesis on law enforcements’ role during a biological event 
establishes that the number one priority for officers is the safety of their families.88  
There are many stressors involved for first responders when responding to 
or participating in a disaster. “The largest is that they must choose between professional 
and familial responsibilities.”89 There are several examples in which professionals have 
tended to the care and safety of family before fulfilling their professional obligations to 
the communities they serve. The most prominent example of this occurred during 
Hurricane Katrina when a significant share of law enforcement personnel did not show 
up for work, although initial reports of officer absenteeism were overstated.90 “At the 
time Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the New Orleans Police Department had a force of 
1,668 sworn officers.  By the time the storm had passed, at least 147 failed to report for 
duty, while 90 percent of the force remained on duty.” 91 “During Hurricane Francis in 
2004, 25 nurses were fired or suspended for leaving early or not reporting to work during 
that event.”92  
In a pandemic the concern for the safety and wellbeing of family will be 
continuous. Unlike most emergencies where there are defined boundaries, beyond which 
families can be taken to be out of harm’s way, there is no safe area during a pandemic.  
 
 
                                                 
87 Qureshi, Health Care Workers’ Ability, 386. 
88 Demme, Government Expectations and the Role of Law Enforcement, 33. 
89 Pangi, After the Attack, 4.  
90 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane 
Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared : Special Report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,2006), 488, 
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/katrinanation.html (accessed December 9, 2006). 
91 Ibid., 490. 
92 Qureshi, Health Care Workers’ Ability, 379. 
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The threat of contracting the flu virus will be ubiquitous and this threat will continue 
throughout the pandemic. Therefore fire departments must plan on fire fighter absences 
for the duration of the pandemic.    
As shown in Chapter 4, fire fighters also hold the safety and concern for 
family as the number one priority in determining their own ability and willingness to 
participate in a pandemic. This study of NCR fire fighters found that only half (51.4%) of 
fire fighters would be willing to participate in a pandemic if an immediate family member 
was seriously ill.  Even fewer, only 30.4 percent, said they would actually be able to 
participate.  
Fire departments will be challenged in addressing this issue as a way to 
improve participation levels. Fire departments cannot force their fire fighters to work 
during a pandemic, particularly when departments allow sick leave to be used to care for 
family members who are ill. Rather, fire departments face the challenge of finding ways 
to remove obstacles and barriers to their employees’ otherwise core desire to respond to 
an emergency.  Family preparedness is clearly a very high priority.  Involving families 
early in planning a response, educating the entire family, and encouraging families to 
develop a sheltering plan and stockpile supplies to minimize the necessity of going within 
the community during a pandemic (and thereby decreasing their exposure risk) will help 
to alleviate fire fighters’ concerns for their families’ wellbeing. 
A primary recommendation would be the development of a support 
network within the fire departments. This concept is similar to the military’s force 
protection strategy.  Spouses of deployed solders lead family readiness groups to support 
and care for families who remain home.  Fire departments could develop fire fighter 
support networks that are station-based and are lead by the spouse of one of the members 
assigned to that station. Additional pay could be given to the member to encourage and 
support this position. The objective would be to develop a support network for all of the 
families assigned to that station or shift, so that in an emergency there is an established 
group that can assist or be called upon at anytime. 
The Fairfax County Fire & Rescue Department’s Virginia Task Force One 
- Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) team utilizes a similar concept. The focus of the 
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Family Support Services Team (FSST) is to provide information, resources, and support 
to families when team members are deployed.93 The FSST is composed of task force 
family members who assist in the team deployment process and maintain contact with the 
team during deployment. The FSST was developed to assist families during the difficult 
times when loved ones are away assisting others.      
The fire department support network would perform a similar service, but 
as an ongoing endeavor. The primary reason for the development of this team would not 
be in preparation for a pandemic; this network would have a larger application within the 
fire service as it could be utilized anytime a colleague or family member is sick or injured 
or anytime a family is in need.  The main purpose would be for fire fighters to have a 
group of people they could rely on during any emergency, personal or work related.  
For this concept to work however, it requires a foundation. Such a network 
can not be established and expected to function efficiently or effectively on the spur of 
the moment during a crisis or emergency. Family support networks must grow and be 
nurtured; families must become comfortable with one another, promoting the concept, 
and developing the trust and relationships necessary to make it work. For a relatively 
small investment, fire departments can demonstrate their support for fire fighters and 
their families by helping to develop this network. In any emergency, fire fighters will be 
more willing and able to work knowing their families have the support and assistance 
they need. 
b. Training and Education 
Training and education are perhaps the most important variables in the 
willingness of fire fighters to participate in a pandemic. Providing training and education 
for specific incidents is extremely important; doing so suggests that such an incident is a 
distinct possibility. Education will notify fire fighters that they will play a role in a 
pandemic and will provide a greater understanding of the pandemic in general. The more 
knowledge people have about pandemic influenza, the more willing they will be to 
participate because they have a greater understanding of the risks. Again, the responses of 
NCR fire fighters clearly demonstrated this point.  In Chapter 4, results showed that only 
                                                 
93 Virginia Task Force One Urban Search and Rescue Section, Family Support Services Team 
(Fairfax, VA: Fairfax County Fire & Rescue, 2008). 
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4 percent (3.9%) of the fire department employees surveyed said they were “very 
knowledgeable” about pandemic flu and just a third (37.8%) self-reported that they were 
knowledgeable.  With a majority of NCR fire fighters admitting they do not know much 
about pandemic flu, any preparedness activities focused on increasing education and 
training could have a substantial impact on the rate at which these employees report to 
work during a pandemic. 
Fire department training will likely increase the WPP. Qureshi’s study of 
emergency preparedness training for public health nurses, for instance, found a 12 
percent increase in nurses’ intentions to report to work following such training. A 2002 
study of the availability of Hawaiian medical professionals to staff non-hospital field 
medical facilities for mass casualty incidents resulting from the use of weapons of mass 
destruction found that the more knowledge and ability physicians and nurses reported, the 
more willing they were to help staff these facilities.94 Training is vitally important as it 
will alert fire fighters to the fact they will play a role in a pandemic and, perhaps more 
importantly, that a pandemic is a distinct possibility.     
General pandemic training and education can be provided to the NCR fire 
departments through a web-based program utilizing existing training developed by NCR 
fire departments. It is recommended the NCR fire departments utilize or increase their 
web-based training for all types of fire and EMS related training. The web-based training 
can be developed at a fraction of the cost of providing the traditional in-service training 
to all departments, can be taken by fire fighters at any location or time, can be tracked to 
ensure compliance, and can be used indefinitely. Additionally, if developed 
collaboratively or agreed upon prior to delivery, web-based training will ensure 
consistency of information, lessening conjecture and misinformation.    
Education and training are critical factors in people’s ability and 
willingness to participate in a pandemic. For fire fighters, this is hardly a surprising or 
controversial observation or practical conclusion.  From the earliest days of a fire 
                                                 
94 Salvatore S. Lanzilotti, et al., "Hawaii Medical Professionals Assessment: A Study of the 
Availability of Doctors and Nurses to Staff Non-Hospital, Field Medical Facilities of Mass Casualty 
Incidents Resulting from the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Level of Knowledge and Skills 
of these Medical Professionals as Related to the Treatment of Victims of of such Incidents," Hawaii 
Medical Journal 61, no. 8 (August, 2002), 168. 
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fighter’s career in recruit school, the knowledge and training received provides the 
confidence and understanding to fight fires. If fire fighters were not provided this 
training, few, if any, would even consider entering a building that was on fire. Why then 
is this not being provided for pandemic preparedness? 
c. Pharmaceutical Interventions 
Vaccines and antivirals are considered possible pharmacological 
interventions in a pandemic. Although they are often grouped and discussed together, 
there are major differences in their use, availability, and purpose. It is likely the majority 
of fire department employees are not aware of these differences, as only 3.6% of 
respondents stated they were “very knowledgeable” about pandemics. Likewise, the 
prevailing assumption by fire fighters, and the fire service in general, is that these 
pharmacological interventions will be available and they will be used primarily as 
preventative measures, to block the virus from infecting fire fighters. The availability of 
these interventions is critical to fire department operations as 50 percent of the fire 
department employees surveyed said that they are “not willing” or “not at all willing” to 
work at their respective fire departments if vaccines or anti-viral medications are not 
available. The numerous variables involved with each intervention render the availability 
and use of these medications unlikely in a pandemic. Fire department leadership must 
communicate these issues to their workforce before a pandemic strikes; doing so will 
lessen the expectations of fire fighters that these interventions will be available.    
Vaccines are considered to be the best preventive measure against 
pandemic flu. However, due to the development and manufacturing process, limited 
production capacity, limited availability, designated priority recommendations list, and 
distribution methods, they are likely not a viable option for fire fighters in the initial 
stages of a pandemic. “If an influenza pandemic starts, planners know that six months 
will elapse before current technology will allow development of a well-matched 
vaccine.”95 
                                                 
95 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Pandemic Planning Update IV: A Report 
from Secretary Michael O. Leavitt (Washington, DC: Department of Health and Human Services, July 18, 
2007), 7, http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/panflureport4.pdf (accessed January 12, 2008). 
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Typically, it takes a relatively significant time to identify and manufacture 
a vaccine. The “flu vaccine is currently produced in chicken eggs in a time-consuming 
process with a six-month lead time.  Since a vaccine could not be mass produced against a 
pandemic flu strain until that strain emerged, planning assumes that flu vaccine will not 
be available for initial global pandemic control.” 96 The concern over the H5N1 (avian 
flu) virus has spurred efforts to develop a vaccine in the event this virus becomes 
communicable. “In April 2007, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) took an historic 
step when it approved the first human H5N1 vaccine…Some 12 million doses (enough 
for 6 million people) have been stockpiled by the U.S. government.”97 This vaccine could 
be used at the beginning of a pandemic but the likelihood of its effectiveness remains 
suspect and will probably not be fully known until a pandemic strikes.  
The limited production capacity within the United States greatly reduces 
both the availability of the vaccine and the capacity to “produce sufficient pandemic 
vaccine for all Americans in advance of a possible (many experts would say “likely”) 
second pandemic wave.”98 The federal government is diligently working on this issue. 
“Over the next five years, vaccine manufacturers, spurred by a $1 billion HHS 
investment, will develop the capacity to produce and deliver enough pandemic vaccine 
for every man, woman, and child in the United States within six months of the 
appearance of a pandemic virus.”99 Until sufficient quantities exist for every citizen, or 
the United States is able to expand its production capacity, the vaccine will have to be 
stockpiled and distributed based on prioritization.  
The federal government owns and maintains this vaccine.100 If the H5N1 
virus becomes readily communicable, the vaccine will be distributed through the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and dispersed to the states. 101 If the virus comes from 
a completely separate flu strain, the H5N1 vaccine will likely be ineffective and not be 
                                                 
96 Sarah A. Lister, Pandemic Influenza: Domestic Preparedness Efforts (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, November 10, 2005), 23-24. 
97 DHHS, Pandemic Planning Update IV, 7. 
98 Ibid., 2. 
99 Ibid., 8. 
100 Lister, Pandemic Influenza: Domestic Preparedness Efforts, 2. 
101 Ibid., 2.  
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distributed for use. If the H5N1 vaccine is to be used in a pandemic, can the vaccine be 
distributed and administered through the SNS before the influenza virus reaches the 
United States?   
The federal government anticipates that a pandemic will likely originate 
overseas, most likely in Asia, and take approximately three months to spread to the 
United States. This will provide advance warning so that many of the federal 
interventions can be distributed and put into position. Although a pandemic vaccine will 
likely not be available within that first three months, this would certainly allow amply 
time to distribute additional supplies and equipment. However, these assumptions are not 
fool-proof. There is the possibility that the pandemic will originate in the United States, 
as was likely the case for the 1918 pandemic,102 and there is the further possibility that 
the virus will spread more quickly than the estimated three months. If either of these 
possibilities were to occur, the distribution of stockpiled pharmaceuticals, equipment, and 
supplies would be severely compromised. Pandemic stockpile distribution plans should 
be based on assumptions whereby the virus originates within the United States. If plans 
were developed based on this assumption, they could be used regardless of where the 
virus originates. 
If the H5N1 vaccine is distributed before the influenza virus reaches the 
United States, who will receive the vaccine?  Because there are not sufficient quantities 
of the vaccine for everyone, the allocation must be prioritized. See Table 13 for DHHS ‘s 







                                                 
102 John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History (New 
York, NY: Penguin Group, 2004), 4.  
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Table 13. Vaccine Priority Group Recommendations* 
 
Tier Subtier Population Rationale 
A • Vaccine and antiviral 
manufacturers and others 
essential to manufacturing and 
critical support (~40,000)  
• Medical workers and public 
health workers who are involved 
in direct patient contact, other 
support services essential for 
direct patient care, and 
vaccinators (8-9 million) 
• Need to assure 
maximum production 
of vaccine and 
antiviral drugs  
• Healthcare workers are 
required for quality 
medical care (studies 
show outcome is 
associated with staff-
to-patient ratios). 
There is little surge 
capacity among 
healthcare sector 
personnel to meet 
increased demand 
1 
B • Persons > 65 years with one or 
more influenza high-risk 
conditions, not including 
essential hypertension 
(approximately 18.2 million)  
• Persons six months to 64 years 
with two or more influenza high-
risk conditions, not including 
essential hypertension 
(approximately 6.9 million)  
• Persons six months or older with 
history of hospitalization for 
pneumonia or influenza or other 
influenza high-risk condition in 
the past year (740,000) 
• These groups are at 
high risk of 
hospitalization and 
death. Excludes 
elderly in nursing 
homes and those who 
are 
immunocompromised 
and would not likely 
be protected by 
vaccination 
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Tier Subtier Population Rationale 
C • Pregnant women (approximately 
3.0 million)  
• Household contacts of severely 
immunocompromised persons 
who would not be vaccinated due 
to likely poor response to vaccine 
(1.95 million with transplants, 
AIDS, and incident cancer x 1.4 
household contacts per person = 
2.7 million persons)  
• Household contacts of children 
<6 month olds (5.0 million) 
• In past pandemics and 
for annual influenza, 
pregnant women have 
been at high risk; 
vaccination will also 
protect the infant who 
cannot receive 
vaccine.  
• Vaccination of 
household contacts of 
immunocompromised 
and young infants will 
decrease risk of 
exposure and infection 
among those who 
cannot be directly 
protected by 
vaccination 
D • Public health emergency 
response workers critical to 
pandemic response (assumed 
one-third of estimated public 
health workforce=150,000)  
• Key government leaders 
• Critical to implement 
pandemic response 
such as providing 
vaccinations and 
managing/monitoring 
response activities  
• Preserving decision-
making capacity also 
critical for managing 
and implementing a 
response 
2 A • Healthy 65 years and older (17.7 
million)  
• Six months to 64 years with one 
high-risk condition (35.8 million) 
• 6-23 months old, healthy (5.6 
million) 
• Groups that are also at 
increased risk but not 
as high risk as 
population in Tier 1B 
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Tier Subtier Population Rationale 
B • Other public health emergency 
responders (300,000 = remaining 
two-thirds of public health work 
force)  
• Public safety workers including 
police, fire, 911 dispatchers, and 
correctional facility staff (2.99 
million)  
• Utility workers essential for 
maintenance of power, water, 
and sewage system functioning 
(364,000)  
• Transportation workers 
transporting fuel, water, food, 
and medical supplies as well as 
public ground public 
transportation (3.8 million)  
• Telecommunications/IT for 
essential network operations and 
maintenance (1.08 million) 
• Includes critical 
infrastructure groups 
that have impact on 
maintaining health 
(e.g., public safety or 
transportation of 
medical supplies and 
food); implementing a 
pandemic response; 
and on maintaining 
societal functions 
3   • Other key government health 
decision-makers (estimated 
number not yet determined)  
• Funeral directors/embalmers 
(62,000) 
• Other important 
societal groups for a 
pandemic response but 
of lower priority 
4   • Healthy persons 2-64 years not 
included in above categories 
(179.3 million) 
• All persons not 
included in other 
groups based on 
objective to vaccinate 
all those who want 
protection 
  *The committee focused its deliberations on the U.S. civilian population. ACIP and NVAC recognize that 
Department of Defense needs should be highly prioritized. DoD Health Affairs indicates that 1.5 million 
service members would require immunization to continue current combat operations and preserve critical 
components of the military medical system. Should the military be called upon to support civil authorities 
domestically, immunization of a greater proportion of the total force will become necessary. These factors 
should be considered in the designation of a proportion of the initial vaccine supply for the military. 
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Fire and emergency response personnel are classified in Tier Two of this 
prioritization; however, this prioritization is inconsistent with CDC guidance and 
pandemic.gov. According to the Draft Guidance on Allocating and Targeting Pandemic 
Influenza, issued October 17, 2007 and located on the Pandemicflu.gov and CDC’s 
websites, EMS and fire personnel are classified as Tier 1 – the highest priority group.103 
It is uncertain whether this guidance trumps DHHS’s Vaccine Prioritization 
Recommendations. What it does demonstrate is the confusion and complexity associated 
with vaccine prioritization.  
There are too many variables involved with the manufacturing, 
availability, effectiveness, and distribution of vaccines to consider them a reliable 
pharmacological intervention that will be available to fire fighters before a pandemic 
influenza reaches the United States. It is recommended that the fire service assume that 
effective vaccines will not be available until six months into a pandemic. It is incumbent 
upon fire department leadership to understand these issues and convey them to their 
workforce. This should increase the overall WPP because fire fighters will understand 
that pharmaceutical interventions are not a practical option or solution to preventing the 
spread or infection of the flu virus. Additionally, fire fighters will also understand that 
vaccine availability is largely out of the control of their respective fire departments. 
Since vaccines will likely not be available until six months after the 
pandemic, there has been great interest in alternative pharmaceuticals to treat or prevent 
serious illness resulting from the flu. The idea is to use these drugs to slow the spread of 
the flu and minimize the health consequences to the individual until an effective vaccine 
is developed and available. To slow the spread, antivirals would be given proactively to 
those potentially exposed through prophylactic treatment. To minimize the health 
consequences, antivirals would be given as a treatment to those who have the influenza 
virus. 
The likelihood of fire fighters using antivirals as prophylaxis is remote, 
not only for the NCR but throughout the nation. It is currently not a practical option for 
                                                 
103 Draft Guidance on Allocating and Targeting Pandemic Influenza Vaccine (Washington, DC: 
Department of Health and Human Services, October 17, 2007), 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/vaccine/prioritization.pdf  (accessed February 15, 2008).   
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fire departments because the antiviral medication would have to be administered a couple 
of times a day, potentially throughout the duration of the pandemic. Cost, uncertainty of 
effectiveness, availability, and the health consequences from long-term use are other 
limiting factors.  
Using antivirals for preventive treatment requires that the medication be 
used prior to exposure and possibly throughout the duration of the pandemic, when 
continuous exposure to the flu virus is expected or anticipated, or until a vaccine is 
developed. In theory this would require an individual to take the medication two times 
per day for up to a year and a half.104 The cost105 and availability of the drug render this 
option unfeasible. 
Currently, there are two types of antivirals used to treat seasonal flu: 
adamantanes and neuraminidase inhibitors (NIs).106 The trouble is the H5N1 strain has 
shown resistance to adamantanes. “Hence, planning efforts for a possible H5N1 
pandemic have focused on NIs. Two NIs are available, and both are licensed by the FDA: 
oseltamivir (Tamiflu®) and zanamivir (Relenza®).”107 However, it is uncertain whether 
any antiviral will be effective against the flu virus during a pandemic. In January of 2008, 
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) reported that 
preliminary results indicate the seasonal flu strain circulating in Europe shows 
resistancesto oseltamivir.108  
Perhaps most importantly, there is limited research on the medical 
implications and side effects from extended anti-viral use. Administration of the antiviral 
medication is likely to be safe in the short term; however, on November 13, 2006, the 
FDA approved a labeling supplement for oseltamivir to include a precaution about 
neuropsychiatric events.  
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The revision is based on postmarketing reports (mostly from Japan) of 
self-injury and delirium with the use of Tamiflu in patients with influenza. 
The reports were primarily among pediatric patients. The relative 
contribution of the drug to these events is not known. However, people 
with the flu, particularly children, may be at an increased risk of self-
injury and confusion shortly after taking Tamiflu and should be closely 
monitored for signs of unusual behavior.109 
Additionally, the health consequences of long-term antiviral use have not been 
sufficiently studied and are not known.  
The availability of antivirals also remains uncertain. The goal of the 
federal government has been to stockpile enough antiviral drugs to treat 25 percent of the 
population. 110 The federal government has stockpiled approximately 81 million doses, 
the majority of which are available primarily in the SNS; 31 million doses have been 
made available to individual states.111 The states are required to develop plans on the 
prioritization and distribution of the antivirals.  
The distribution of these stockpiles is also problematic.  “State and local 
planners often lack the necessary systems, staffing, and training for distributing 
stockpiled drugs and supplies. Peak demand usually occurs within the first 24 hours of a 
disaster, and national stockpiles were designed to supplement local capabilities rather 
than as a first-response tool.”112 One has to question the probability of antivirals reaching 
their final destination in sufficient time to be effectively utilized. It is unreasonable to 
expect that these drugs will be distributed to their respective locations through the SNS 
and subsequently re-distributed to a particular group or location prior to the influenza 
striking.      
In January of 2007, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council 
recommended that the federal government “develop an appropriate forum to identify, 
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quantify, and qualify potential prioritization and distribution methods and channels.”113 I 
participated in a discussion at the Institute of Medicine in December 2007, on the 
distribution of antiviral medications. The IOM committee on the Implementation of 
Antiviral Medication Strategies for an Influenza Pandemic was convened to discuss 
various issues surrounding implementing an antiviral drug program in an influenza 
pandemic. It is evident from the discussion that prioritization of antiviral medication has 
not been finalized, nor have the methods of distribution.    
The COG Health Officials Committee, a committee comprised of local 
public health directors within the NCR, recommended against using Urban Area Security 
Initiative (UASI) funding for stockpiling antivirals. The Health Officials Committee 
recommended the following issues be considered before the stockpiling and use of 
Tamiflu: (1) because of the scarcity of Tamiflu, the best and most ethical use will change 
during the pandemic; (2) treatment of ill patients will always take priority; and (3) it is 
not efficient to use Tamiflu for prophylaxis. There are other variables that must be 
considered, including the amount of Tamiflu® available in the world, nationally and 
locally; the effectiveness and availability of other antivirals; the expected time line to 
having the vaccine available, the number of people ill, how easy it is to transmit the 
disease; and how deadly the disease is, the status of essential supplies and services; 
etc.114 This essentially means that unless fire departments or individual jurisdictions 
purchase antivirals on their own behalf, or federal stockpiles become available, antivirals 
will not be available to fire department employees for preventive measures.115 
Currently, fire department employees believe that antivirals and vaccines 
will be available. In fact, providing vaccines, antivirals, or medication to fire department 
employees was considered critical by 65.4 percent of the respondents. Ninety-eight 
                                                 
113 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, The Prioritization of Critical Infrastructure for a 
Pandemic Outbreak in the United States Working Group: Final Report and Recommendations by the 
Council (Washington, DC: National Infrastructure Advisory Council, 2007), 41, 
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114 Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments Health Officials Committee, 
“Recommendations on Stockpiling and Use of Tamiflu.” Received via email from a member of the Council 
of Governments, January 13, 2008. 
115 The NOVA jurisdiction, through MMRS, purchased a small stockpile of antiviral medication that 
can be used during an initial pandemic outbreak. First responders may have access to this medication if 
they were directly involved in this initial outbreak. 
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percent of the respondents considered it as important, very important, or critical. For 
these reasons, fire departments must inform their employees that vaccines will likely not 
be available for up to six months from the start of the pandemic; and antivirals likely will 
not be used as a prophylaxis measure during a pandemic. Education becomes critical in 
providing a balanced understanding of the probable interventions available to fire fighters 
during a pandemic. Through education, fire fighters will understand that vaccines and 
antiviral interventions are largely outside the control of the fire department, and that their 
overall availability and effectiveness is suspect. For planning purposes, fire departments 
should consider these pharmaceutical interventions as unlikely and instead focus on 
traditional infection control measures.  
A layered approach to infection control is the recommended approach for 
fire departments to adhere to and practice. The following figure (Figure 2) shows the 
Layers of Infection Control to which fire departments should subscribe. Practicing proper 
hygiene is the foundation of infectious control. This includes staying home when ill, 
covering the mouth when coughing, and washing hands. PPE is the middle layer of 
infection control; having appropriate and sufficient quantities of PPE available is 
certainly achievable for fire departments and provides enhanced protection for all fire 
fighters. The last layer of protection, and the most unreliable, are medications. If 
available, these interventions probably should be used, but they do not render the other 
layers obsolete. Proper protection from the influenza virus, or any infectious disease, 










Figure 2.   Layers of Protection Diagram 
 
d. Worker’s Compensation 
Worker’s compensation is an important issue for fire fighters within the 
NCR with over 76 percent of the respondents stating they would be “not willing” or “not 
at all willing” to participate in a pandemic if they were not covered for ANY illness 
received during a pandemic. This means illnesses contracted as a result of patient contact 
and illnesses resulting from the administration of pharmacological interventions – 
antivirals and vaccines.  A significant reduction in workforce levels will likely result if 
fire fighters are not comprehensively covered under worker’s compensation for any 
illness contracted during the course of their work.   
Currently, fire departments and state legislatures are at an advantage 
because fire fighters generally assume that they will be covered under worker’s 
compensation for any injury or illness they contract during the course of their 
employment. Consequently, these issues tend only to become concerns once fire fighters 
understand that they will not be covered. Because a pandemic has not yet occurred and 
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fire fighters have not become ill or died, they are likely to participate in larger numbers 
than if they knew prior to a pandemic occurring that they would not be covered. States 
and fire departments do not have an obligation to inform their employees of the extent of 
their worker’s compensation coverage; however, should this information become 
available, and should workers not be covered, it will likely have a considerable impact on 
the WPP.  
Fire fighters need to be protected, under the law, for any illness, death, or 
disease that can be directly linked or presumed to result from their employment. It is 
imperative that this protection include illnesses, deaths, and diseases that result, either 
directly or indirectly, from the flu virus or antiviral and vaccine administration. 
Comprehensive protection is necessary because the health consequences of pandemic 
influenza and antiviral and vaccine interventions are not completely known and tested. 
“The HHS final plan notes that if a pandemic were to spread swiftly, pandemic vaccine 
may be pressed into service before standard safety and efficacy tests could be completed. 
Such unlicensed vaccine could be used under FDA’s Investigational New Drug 
provisions.”116  
Perhaps most importantly, fire fighters need to be covered under worker’s 
compensation for illnesses contracted due to exposure to flu victims. Fire fighters will 
have increased exposure to flu victims – and an increased chance of contracting the flu 
virus – due to the increased number of flu patients. The health consequences resulting 
from such exposure are unknown, but are likely to be severe, as no one will have prior 
immunity to the virus. There is a very real likelihood that many fire fighters will become 
ill and die after contracting the virus. 
Should a pandemic occur today, Virginia fire fighters would most likely 
be covered under worker’s compensation if they were to contract the flu virus. Further 
analysis needs to be conducted on the laws in Maryland and the District of Columbia to 
determine the extent of coverage afforded fire fighters in these localities.  
The Commonwealth of Virginia already recognizes that fire fighters are at 
greater risk of contracting certain diseases and sets parameters within the law to classify 
                                                 
116 Lister, Pandemic Influenza:Domestic Preparedness Efforts, 27. 
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such exposure as “occupational disease.” “The term ‘occupational disease’ means a 
disease arising out of and in the course of employment, but not an ordinary disease of life 
to which the general public is exposed outside of the employment.”117 Virginia also 
identifies occupational disease whereby “the death… or any health condition or 
impairment…resulting in total or partial disability shall be presumed to be occupational 
disease, suffered in the line of duty, that are covered by this title unless such presumption 
is overcome by a preponderance of the evidence to the contrary.”118 In essence, certain 
diseases contracted by fire fighters, who meet the minimum time requirement and have 
documented exposures, are considered to have been contracted through and due to their 
employment and are covered by worker’s compensation. In Virginia, respiratory diseases, 
hypertension or heart disease, leukemia or pancreatic, prostate, rectal, throat, ovarian or 
breast cancer fall under presumptive diseases.119 
Currently, pandemic influenza is not covered as a presumptive illness 
under Virginia law. If Virginia fire fighters were to become stricken with the pandemic 
influenza they would have to prove that they contracted the virus through the course of 
their employment. Technically, this requires the fire fighter to prove that, at a particular 
time and place during their employment, they contracted the virus. Obviously this would 
be impossible, as the virus will be ubiquitous and can be spread from one person to the 
next before symptoms occur.120 Fire fighters who contract the flu virus will not be able to 
unequivocally prove where and when they contracted the virus, particularly when family 
members and co-workers are ill. It is for this reason that pandemic flu should be 
classified under law as a presumptive disease. 
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Classifying pandemic influenza as a presumptive disease is a cost-neutral 
proposition for Virginia. Currently, the Virginia Professional Fire Fighters Union is 
attempting to have pandemic influenza covered as a presumptive disease through House 
Bill 532 and Senate Bill 500. For every bill submitted, a fiscal impact estimate is 
conducted. The fiscal implication for House Bill 532 states: 
The legislation may result in an increase in the number of claims filed 
with the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission on behalf of either 
the claimant or employer when there has been a work-related diagnosis of 
an occupational disease, which would require the declaration of a state of 
emergency by the Governor. The potential increase in the number of 
claims filed under the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act cannot be 
determined. The legislation also expands the definition of infectious 
disease presumption, which would limit the number of claims litigated.121 
Essentially, costs will only be incurred in the event of a pandemic in which the governor 
has declared a state of emergency. 
The proposed bills only cover pandemic influenza. There are no 
provisions for coverage for illnesses resulting from the administration of antivirals and 
vaccines.  The Virginia Department of Health Pandemic Influenza Plan states that “VDH 
will review legal issues such as worker’s compensation laws to determine how they apply 
to healthcare workers and other essential workers who take antivirals for prophylaxis.”122  
It is extremely important that these issues are addressed well in advance of a pandemic 
and the decisions conveyed to fire fighters throughout the state. 
Worker’s compensation coverage for vaccine administration may be a 
little more challenging, as vaccines are federally controlled but distributed through the 
states. Regardless, either states or the federal government should protect fire fighters 
when mandating or recommending vaccines. Currently, certain vaccines are covered 
under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP)… Congress enacted 
the program in 1986 as a no-fault alternative to the tort system for resolving personal 
injury claims resulting from adverse reactions to recommended childhood vaccines… 
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Congress added trivalent flu vaccine (the annual vaccine that contains three strains) to the 
VICP list in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (P.L.108-357). Since the law 
explicitly covered trivalent vaccine, monovalent (or single-strain) pandemic vaccines 
would not be covered under VICP.123 Obviously the federal government has recognized 
the importance of affording protection to those who have taken certain vaccines. The 
government should consider affording this protection to fire fighters in the event of a 
pandemic. 
Following the events of September 11, 2001, politicians and elected 
officials praised first responders and their mission and position within the communities 
they serve. These officials emphasized the importance of first responders’ collective well-
being by providing for and doing whatever was necessary to protect them. Many of these 
politicians understood the new roles and responsibilities fire departments would now face 
– having to respond and mitigate a variety of new possibilities, both manmade and 
natural. The National Preparedness Guidelines listed the fifteen National Planning 
Scenarios. These scenarios “depict a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios of 
both potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters.”124 Legislative authorities are aware of 
the potential catastrophic emergencies outlined in the National Preparedness Guidelines. 
These leaders have distributed billions of dollars to ensure fire fighters are better equipped 
and prepared for these events. However, not enough has been done in the legislative arena to 
protect fire fighters and their families from illness contracted in the line of duty. As New 
Jersey State Senator Stephen Sweeney said upon introducing emergency worker 
compensation legislation in December, 2007: “But these brave men and women, they don’t 
hesitate, they’re there looking out for us, we have to look out for them.”125 
e. Personal Protective Equipment 
Fire departments have an obligation to provide adequate personal 
protective equipment (PPE) for their employees. If fire departments have accepted a 
certain responsibility or adopted a particular mission, they have the responsibility to 
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ensure their members are adequately trained, equipped, and protected. This has occurred 
throughout the fire service on several occasions within the last thirty years when the fire 
service expanded its mission to include emergency medical services, hazardous materials 
mitigation, and technical rescue. As this mission has expanded, fire departments have had 
to provide the necessary training and equipment to the fire fighters responsible for 
fulfilling these missions.    
If a particular fire department is responsible for providing wild-land fire 
protection to the community it serves, and the threat is significant, there is a reasonable 
expectation that the fire department has the responsibility to provide adequate wild-land 
PPE to its members. The same can be said for any potential scenario, situation, or 
circumstance for which there is a reasonably significant threat. This argument can also be 
applied to response to a pandemic, epidemic, or other biological event.  
Fire departments have a responsibility to provide adequate and sufficient 
PPE to their members for a response to a pandemic. In fact, providing adequate and 
sufficient PPE is viewed as critically important by 64.9 percent of the respondents. It is 
viewed as important, very important, or critical by 98.5 percent. Fire departments 
providing adequate and sufficient PPE to members is a significant factor in fire 
department employees’ willingness to participate in a pandemic. If adequate and 
sufficient quantities of PPE are not provided and made available to employees, fire 
departments should expect a significant reduction in participation. Adequate protection 
refers to recommended PPE for which there is sufficient evidence that the proper 
utilization of such equipment will reduce the likelihood of infection due to exposure of 
infected patients. “The findings of Shapira et al. support this idea that provision of 
appropriate PPE can serve to facilitate HCWs willingness to report to duty during a 
WMD event.”126   
The challenge for fire department leadership is in providing sufficient 
quantities of PPE to its employees during a pandemic. “During the SARS outbreak, a 
single Ontario teaching hospital used 18,000 N95 masks per day.”127 Fire departments 
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must determine not only the quantity of PPE, but what types to stockpile for a pandemic. 
In April of 2007, DHS issued Pandemic Influenza Best Practices and Model Protocols, 
which recommends that sufficient PPE be stockpiled for first responders in advance of a 
pandemic. Additionally, it recommends the following equipment and supplies be 
stockpiled prior to a pandemic outbreak: 
o Suggested PPE/response items include:  
● N-95 masks for first responders128  
● Surgical masks for responders without direct patient care responsibilities.  
● Disposable gloves  
● Alcohol-based hand cleanser/disinfectant  
● Eye shields/safety glasses  
● Disposable gowns  
● Compressed oxygen  
● Prophylaxis (two weeks dosing per person)  
o Suggested mission critical items include:  
● Food and water  
● Cleaning/disinfecting supplies 
● Fuel  
● Family or child care considerations 129 
 
Several fire departments, both within the NCR and nationally, have begun 
to address this issue. The Draft Seattle Fire Department Plan states in its planning 
principles section that “parts of the plan depend upon action taken prior to an event. For 
instance, the use of full PPE during an event depends on acquiring sufficient supplies of 
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PPE beforehand to account for event-related supply limitations.”130 Further in the plan 
the department recognizes its responsibility to protect its members stating:  
The Seattle Fire Department is committed to “maximizing protection 
against communicable disease for (its) members” as stated in Policy 6005. 
The proper use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) minimizes 
exposure to infectious disease.   Work practices and Dispatch 07-06 
dictate: “Gloves and Eye Protection will be worn for all patient contacts.”  
Gowns and fit-tested masks are worn when body fluid splash protection is 
required or an infectious situation is known or suspected.131  
To ensure adequate protection is available during a pandemic, the Seattle 
Fire Department has developed cost estimates based on planning assumptions which 
provide PPE for all employees based on increased EMS responses over a twelve-week 
period. The following table summarizes the cost estimate. 
 
Table 14. Seattle Fire Department PPE Cost Estimate 
 
Personal Protective Equipment $975,000 
Waterless Hand Sanitation $ 15,000 
Decontamination Equipment $150,000 
Emergency Rations $100,000 
Information Technology $ 50,000 
Training $ 50,000 
Total $1,340,000 
 
Fire department leaders recognize that the rank and file expects the 
department to provide sufficient PPE.  The survey of NCR fire fighters suggest they may 
not.  Although a good two-thirds (63.2%) of the fire department employees said that they 
were “confident” or “very confident” that sufficient PPE would be provided by or 
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through their respective fire departments, a significant minority questions their 
department’s preparedness.  Fire fighters expect that their departments will provide 
adequate and sufficient quantities of PPE during a pandemic and departments must 
realize that to ensure sufficient PPE is available will require that this PPE is stockpiled.  
D. SUMMARY 
Unquestionably, the preparedness and coordination required before and during a 
pandemic are enormous and often overwhelming. With limited resources and personnel, 
where do fire departments begin? As suggested throughout this chapter, preparation must 
begin with an emphasis on the core issues affecting fire fighters’ ability and willingness 
to participate in a pandemic. The availability of fire fighters is the foundation for 
determining the capacity of fire departments, particularly during a pandemic. Initially fire 
departments should assess their particular situations with regard to each of these core 
issues by asking: Do we have a family support network? Are our fire fighters covered 
under worker’s compensation? Have we provided any pandemic training or education? 
Have we stockpiled adequate personal protective equipment? This assessment will assist 
in narrowing the departmental focus by identifying areas of need. Fire departments can 
then prioritize focus areas.  
Fire departments have a responsibility not only to the citizens they protect and 
serve, but to their fire fighters who do the protecting and serving.  A pandemic will be 
unlike any previous emergency or event and the unique circumstances of participating in 
an “unknown” emergency will significantly impact fire fighters. However, through 
proactively addressing these issues, fire departments can demonstrate their concern for 
their employees while helping to ensure that services can and will be provided to their 



























This study was initiated to determine the concerns and issues fire fighters have 
with participating in a pandemic. Collectively, the twelve NCR fire departments were 
surveyed because a pandemic will likely impact the region simultaneously and equally. 
Understanding the potential consequences of a pandemic on a regional scale was viewed 
as critically important to illustrate the potential impact on fire department operations. 
Specifically, this study identified the variables impacting fire fighters’ ability and 
willingness to participate in a pandemic, in an effort to establish a workforce participation 
percentage (WPP). The WPP, in turn, can be utilized by fire departments as a planning 
assumption for development of pandemic response plans. 
A number of variables exist which will affect fire fighter participation rates. The 
core issues affecting fire fighters’ willingness to participate in a pandemic include: the 
safety of and concern for family; a sufficient and adequate supply of PPE; fire department 
plans; worker’s compensation coverage, and the availability of pharmaceutical 
interventions. The core issues affecting fire fighters’ ability to participate in a pandemic 
include: the safety of and concern for family and childcare. It is critical that fire 
departments increase their understanding and awareness of these issues because 
potentially departments could be faced with workforces reduced by 30-70% over and 
above the clinical attack rate.  
Currently, it is evident that the majority of fire departments within the NCR have 
not allocated sufficient time, resources, or planning for this potentially catastrophic event 
based on the lack of training and education, personal protective equipment stockpiling, 
and fire department plans. Perhaps fire departments don’t appreciate the gravity of the 
situation or perhaps they do, but do not have the resources to address these issues. 
Regardless of particulars, fire departments must understand that there are many variables 
which will impact fire fighters’ ability and willingness to participate in a pandemic. 
Departments can choose to address these issues and positively influence fire fighter 
participation rates or they can choose not to address these issues and hope that a 
pandemic does not occur.  
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The variables associated with fire fighters’ ability and willingness to work during 
a pandemic are extensive. Effectively addressing these variables requires a multi-prong 
approach because, ultimately, a fire fighter’s decision is situationally dependent. There is 
not a single issue or concern that – if effectively addressed by fire departments – will 
ensure participation of all fire fighters. Rather, there are multiple variables which should 
be addressed simultaneously, so as to positively affect the greatest range of fire fighters.   
It is for this reason that leadership becomes the primary solution. Leaders who 
appreciate the magnitude of the situation and the criticality of these particular issues can 
positively influence the WPP and promote pandemic preparedness. If leaders take 
seriously the findings and viewpoints of the fire fighters in the NCR, supported by studies 
of other professional groups, they face a major challenge in planning effectively for a 
pandemic.  Strong leadership is required to effectively coordinate the complexities a 
pandemic does and will generate. 
Leadership is the key to all aspects of pandemic awareness, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. Leadership is critical because an effective pandemic response 
must start well in advance of a pandemic striking. This requires leadership – to have 
vision, understand and appreciate the multitude of issues and factors involved, 
comprehend the consequences, unify and collaborate with the stakeholders, and see the 
big picture. For a pandemic will not be a battle; it will be a war.  A pandemic will affect 
every sector and segment of society, from schools to healthcare providers, from children 
to the elderly. The complexity of a pandemic and the variables associated with fire fighter 
participation rates require leaders to promote leadership throughout their organizations. 
Leaders at all levels and in all areas will be needed to coordinate, prepare, plan, and 
respond to minimize the consequence of a pandemic. Leaders can only effectively 
prepare for a pandemic by encouraging leadership throughout their organizations.   
Fire department leaders must take a dual approach, by addressing the issues and 
concerns fire fighters have regarding participation in a pandemic while simultaneously 
developing or enhancing regional fire department preparedness. Not only will a pandemic 
affect the region equally and simultaneously, but many of the concerns fire fighters have 
can and should be approach on a regional level. For example, worker’s compensation 
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laws are developed on the state level, but can be influenced through regional 
collaboration between departments and or unions through lobbying the state legislature.  
Departmental leadership should encourage this cross-jurisdictional partnership, as greater 
success is more likely when coalitions combine. Likewise, the stockpiling of PPE could 
be accomplished through regional cooperation; fire departments can apply for federal 
grants through the COG to stockpile and house required PPE. Again, greater 
achievements can be obtained when forces combine.  
Perhaps most importantly, the development of a fire department regional response 
plan should be pursued. The development of a regional plan would help to ensure that 
departments are consistent in their pandemic preparedness and response efforts across the 
entire region. Although mutual aid is extended everyday within the NCR, it is sure to 
become an issue during a pandemic, particularly if one department is less prepared than 
the next. Development of a regional response plan can address this issue, prior to it 
becoming an issue during a pandemic. The complexity a pandemic will create will be 
overwhelming. Fire departments should strive to address many of these concerns and 
potential problems now, before a pandemic strikes. The development of a regional fire 
department plan is the perfect venue to discuss and address these issues. 
Are the NCR fire departments prepared and ready for a pandemic? To date, has 
sufficient cross-discipline, agency, department, and jurisdictional dialogue and planning 
been accomplished to best prepare the NCR for the catastrophic consequences of a 
pandemic? The answer is no. There are several reasons why sufficient progress has not 
been made within the NCR: lack of understanding or acceptance of the threat, perception 
of a limited scope of pandemic planning, the silo effect on jurisdictions, and ineffective 
leadership. 
A pandemic is a real threat and is certain to occur at some point in time. However, 
pandemic preparedness efforts have not been given the same weight as other fire 
department imperatives. Perhaps, because only three pandemics occurred last century 
(with the last occurring nearly forty years ago), the threat is not truly considered high. 
Regardless of the reason, one would think that an imminent event would garner greater 
attention, particularly because of the potential consequences. 
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The seemingly narrow focus of a pandemic plan may lessen the appeal for fire 
service and governmental leadership. To dedicate a significant amount of time, money, 
and effort to developing a plan for a relatively remote, albeit distinct, event that has 
limited applications within the fire service, is unpractical. However, a pandemic plan can 
be utilized in a variety of different incidents, emergencies, or scenarios. A pandemic plan 
could be utilized for any infectious disease or epidemic (staph infection, SARS, AIDs); it 
could be utilized for any situation which may cause a reduction in the workforce; or any 
significant incident impacting the region. According to the WHO, “since the 1970s… 
new threats have been identified at an ‘unprecedented rate’ of one or more every year, 
meaning that nearly 40 diseases exist today which were unknown just over a generation 
ago.”132 Additionally, “disasters are increasingly common. Worldwide, a major disaster 
occurs almost daily. In the United States, a disaster has occurred, on average, every week 
for the past 10 years, according to the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Every 
region of the country is at risk for some type of disaster.”133 Planning for a pandemic 
could only enhance preparedness and response capabilities for any event, whether it be an 
epidemic, terrorist attack, or regional natural disaster. It is unfathomable, considering the 
potential consequences that these events pose, that the threat is not taken more seriously 
by our local governmental leaders. “It would be extremely naïve and complacent to 
assume that there will not be another disease like AIDS, another Ebola, or another SARS, 
sooner or later.”134  
Perhaps a reason that more preparedness has not occurred within the NCR is the 
silo effect which occurs at all government levels. The silo effect of distinct cultures, 
budgets, and narrowly focused career ascendancy compels government agencies toward 
self-protectiveness, insularity, and allegiance to their own agency-based advocacy and 
independence. There are also deeply ingrained traditions of rivalry and palpable struggles 
for control, especially among organizations with similar or overlapping missions and 
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scope of responsibility (Susskind & Cruikshank, 1987).135 The silo effect equates to self 
protection. Fundamentally, jurisdictions and agencies, on all governmental levels, are 
concerned – first and foremost – with their individual wants, needs, and desires. This 
condition does not create an atmosphere conducive to any type of collaboration or 
planning on a grand scale. 
A fundamental change is necessary whereby a more holistic, regional approach is 
encouraged by jurisdictional leadership and management. Counties, cities, towns, and 
communities must begin to think about how their decisions affect and impact surrounding 
jurisdictions.  Local governments, particularly in the NCR, must begin to see themselves 
not as individual jurisdictions, but as a “mega-community.” “A mega-community is a 
public sphere in which organizations – public, private, and civil – join together to address 
a compelling issue of mutual importance.”136 The concept of a mega-community can 
occur on different scales and for different purposes; whether it is battling global warming 
or traffic congestion, the issue is so complex that no single agency can unilaterally 
address the issue. Local government leaders must themselves lead this change in focus 
through their actions and vision. 
Particularly in the case of a pandemic, the NCR should view itself as a literal 
mega-community. Instead of being individual jurisdictions, we need to plan and prepare 
as though we are one. Unquestionably, this is a challenging and lofty proposal, 
considering the multitude of governmental departments, jurisdictions, agencies, and 
interests at hand. None the less, such an approach is necessary to ensure effective 
preparedness. To do this, however, requires a particular type of leader.  
Although there are many strong fire service leaders within the NCR, a focused 
shift of leadership perspective must be encouraged and promoted. If we are to consider 
the NCR as one community, it will require a new type of leader.  
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94 
‘Meta-leadership’ refers to guidance, direction, and momentum across 
organizational lines that develops into a shared course of action and commonality of 
purpose among people and agencies that are doing what appears to be very different 
work. Achieving quick and effective national preparedness requires an array of 
government and non-government organizations to coordinate their planning, 
collaboration, and response to anticipated terrorists acts (Carter, 2003). Leaders who are 
able to influence and accomplish such collaboration of efforts across organizations—
multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency, and public-private—are termed “meta-leaders.137 
Meta-leadership needs to be encouraged throughout the NCR, not only because the 
impact of a pandemic will be unilateral, but because of the enormity of agencies and 
departments at the local, state, and federal levels. An effective response to a pandemic 
requires a collaborative process between and among these stakeholders to produce, 
develop, and implement an effective plan. Preparedness is the key to an effective 
response and meta-leaders are needed to facilitate and ensure that this is accomplished.    
The NCR fire departments have done a good job of collaboration on many levels; 
however, for pandemic preparedness, this progress has been slow and the urgency seems 
to have diminished. “The country does not at present have the luxury to patiently wait 
while agencies take their time to adjust operating procedures and protocols: progress in 
achieving a protected homeland needs to be quicker and deeper than what would occur in 
the normal course of governmental change and response.”138 If these departments, 
agencies, and business continue to operate within their respective “silos,” coordination 
and effective responses will never occur.  Fire department leadership must realize that 
time may not be on our side. The concept of meta-leadership in a mega-community 
should be utilized to address the concerns and issues fire fighters have with participating 
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